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Abstract 
This paper demonstrates that crude estimators can correctly identify statistically significant technical 
patterns in major index data. The introduction of intra-day prices significantly improves a crude 
estimators’ ability to identify technical barriers. Double tops are associated with increases in the prices 
of puts which indicates that supply and demand dynamics may impact options prices in ways not 
previously examined. Moreover, this may be a step in the right direction of identifying the supply and 
demand identification in options markets. Following in line with other work (Gatheral, 2006; Wilmott, 
2006), this is in no way negates the Black-Scholes-Merton delta hedging instantaneous replication 
argument. It simply demonstrates that the Black-Scholes-Merton approach offers a very powerful but 
incomplete theory of options pricing.  
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Introduction 
Overview 
Beginning with Bachelier’s work in the 1900’s and continuing with the Black-Scholes-Merton 
equation in 1973, options pricing has provided fertile ground for both research by academics and for 
extreme profits and losses on the parts of traders. Many practitioners have amassed vast fortunes while 
others blame options trading for periods of extreme instability in vital markets. Pricing options is 
determined by a group of factors of which volatility is a key member.  
The current understanding of volatility is that the implied volatility surface is caused by traders 
forcing volatility arbitrage out of the system. However, transaction costs create risks for trades seeking 
to take advantage of arbitrage because they can’t hedge their positions freely. Traders forcing this 
arbitrage out of the system lead to options prices and the implied volatility surface. In recent years, 
another approach has begun to generate interest and sympathy.  
This view holds that the implied volatility surface is actually better, or at least in part, explained 
by supply and demand dynamics. Unfortunately, the instrumental variable problem is notorious in the 
options literature. In pursuit of an instrument I turn, following Lo’s research, to technical indicators and 
the skew. This theory will be tested by a two stage process. First, I will examine whether technical 
patterns do exhibit predictive power on asset prices. I will next employ statistical tests  to see if that 
shift in price drift does in fact trigger changes in the implied volatility surface that are better explained 
by supply and demand than by the current theories. The predominant modern view, among academics 
and practitioners is that the implied volatility surface is rooted in a stochastic process and/or locally 
defined.  The former is adhered to principally by academics and high-end practitioners while the latter is 
a lesser approach employed by practitioners seeking computational convenience.   
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Specifically within the implied volatility surface, my work has applications with regard to 
understanding the smile and the skew in the implied volatility surface.
1
 It is suspected by many that a 
significant portion of the skew can be explained by the greater demand for puts by equities holders who 
are looking to hedge their long positions. However, academic research in this area has been lacking.  
Long positions constitute the bulk of institutional portfolios for a variety of reasons. Many 
mutual funds have ‘long only’ clauses built into their charters. Beyond that, the long position requires 
the least management because it can be held indefinitely, unlike short positions which have higher 
management requirements. In some cases, portfolios are of such low maintenance that simple 
rebalancing constitutes a major operation for the manager. Finally, very large institutions cannot 
liquidate the entirety of their long position without adversely affecting the price. If the practice of firms 
buying puts to protect these long positions impacts the implied volatility surface, my research would 
offer a new and very significant change in perspective to the field. 
The identification problem nested in understanding the supply and demand dynamic is difficult 
because the researcher will need to identify at least one variable that is correlated to option supply but 
not demand for options. The solution of this identification problem would be a revolutionary innovation 
in modern finance, as it would open the door foe elasticity estimation and polity evaluation. 
Methodology 
 This study employs a pattern recognition algorithm developed by Andrew Lo (Lo, 2000) to 
identify technical trading patterns. This algorithm uses a kernel density estimator to identify clear 
technical patterns. This is a non-parametric approach where an algorithm is chosen to smooth out the 
                                                           
1
 The skew refers to the fact that many equities have out of the money puts that are much more expensive than  
calls that are equally out of the money. The smile refers to the fact that at the money options have a lower implied 
volatility than out of the money options (Wilmott 2006). However, neither result violates put call parity.  
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asset price. After smoothing the asset price, a “template matching” pattern recognition approach is used 
to look for specific technical patterns. 
 This non-parametric approach is useful because it allows us to study a stochastic trend in an 
asset price that is non-linear in nature and may exhibit “long memories”. The major difficulty is that the 
selection of important factors, like the window to use for smoothing, is, as with all non-parametric 
methods, a matter of subjective choice by the researcher. While model selection is part of any research, 
the choice of the window for smoothing can be somewhat arbitrary and must be done carefully. One 
should note that in the same way that the choice of parameters for non-parametric models is left to the 
judgment of the researcher, the selection of a parametric model comes with a certain degree of 
subjectivity as well.   
Application 
This work brings the classic microeconomic explanatory power of supply and demand to bear on 
options prices in a fusion of past (Black-Scholes-Merton) and recent (long memory processes and 
experimental economics) theoretical work. Beyond that, our work will help establish what effect, if any, 
technical patterns have on options prices. This is particularly interesting because it not only addresses 
the controversial topic of technical analysis but incorporates the solution to that argument into a 
complex, but more useful explanatorily, options pricing framework.   
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Literature Review  
As previously noted, options pricing theory began in 1900 with Bachelier’s The Theory of 
Speculation
2
. Bachelier’s work was based in the idea that options are used purely for speculation and 
that prices can be derived using expected value arguments based on the assumption that the asset is a 
continuous time random walk with drift and has a certain level of volatility. His work was largely 
forgotten and then overturned much later by the publication of the Black-Scholes-Merton model in 
1973
3
 (Black 1973, Merton, 1973).  The Black-Scholes-Merton theory used a variety of assumptions and 
a no-arbitrage argument to construct a masterful options pricing framework.  
The most notable part of the Black-Scholes-Merton equation for options pricing is that it does 
not include a drift term in its valuation theorem. This is extremely important because it allows two 
market participants to agree on the price of an option independently of their respective views on the 
future movement of the underlying. Beyond that, it identified a key arbitrage strategy: delta hedging. 
Combined, these two contributions gave market practitioners a fair price to transact options at and a 
market-based mechanism to make sure prices did not persistently deviate from that price (delta 
hedging). The ensuing literature review will present an overview of the Black-Scholes derivation, address 
its assumptions, and addresses the violations of some of these assumptions.  
 
                                                           
2
 For a translation see the citation (Davis, 2006). 
3
 Thorp & Kassouf first effectively described delta hedging in 1967 (Wimott 2006).   
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The Black-Scholes-Merton Derivation 
The following derivation and list of assumptions draws heavily from (Wilmott, 2006). In the Black-
Scholes-Merton framework, the value of an option is expressed as V(S; t; , ; E,T; r). Whereas the first 
two inputs are independent variables, the remaining terms are fully exogenous parameters. 
• S is the asset price and t is time.  
•  is the standard deviation of the asset and  is the drift of the asset price. Both of these are 
constants.  
• E is the exercise price and T is the date of expiry 
• r is the risk-free interest rate 
Now, suppose that the trader wanted to eliminate all risk from a portfolio comprised of both assets 
and options. In order to do this, the trader would need to be long a certain amount of the underlying 
and short a particular quantity of the option that would offset the risk generated by holding that 
underlying. Using  to denote the value of a portfolio of one long option position and a short position in 
some quantityΔ, delta of the underlying, the result is: 
  = 	,  −  Δ	 (1) 
In the above portfolio, it is assumed that the underlying follows a lognormal random walk of the form
4
: 
 	 =  	, 	 +  	, 	 (2) 
The value change of this portfolio from time t to time t + dt is due to both change in the option price and 
the underlying price. The change in the value of the portfolio is then: 
                                                           
4
 For convenience, the (S,t) portion of the equation will be suppressed for the remainder of the proof.  
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  =  − Δ	 (3) 
Using Ito’s Lemma
5
, the result is:  
  =   + 	 	 + ℴ
	2 
	   (4) 
Therefore the portfolio changes by:  
  =   + 	 	 + ℴ
	2 
	   −  Δ	 (5) 
While our initial goal was to eliminate risk, we have not succeeded in doing so. The term dS is 
still both unknown and unknowable (in a perfect sense). This introduces significant risk into the 
portfolio. In order to eliminate this risk, a hedging strategy will need to be chosen in order to shield the 
portfolio from the unpredictable impacts of dS. Setting  Δ =  entirely removes risk from the portfolio. 
This means that we will employ a strategy of delta hedging where we actively maintain the above 
equality in the portfolio. After choosing the quantity Δ as suggested, the portfolio’s value now changes 
by the amount: 
 Π =  + 12 ℴ	  
	  (6) 
                                                           
5
 Ito’s Lemma is the stochastic calculus counterpart of the chain rule in ordinary calculus and is essentially the 
Taylor series expansion of an equation that retains the second order term related to the stochastic component 
change. Central to the result is the convergence of squared, properly scaled by / Brownian sequences to dt.  
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This change makes the portfolio completely riskless. It does not contain the drift term or any other 
unpredictable process. This means that the portfolio has the return of the risk-free rate. This finding 
leads to the no arbitrage principle: 
 Π = Π (7) 
Substituting in previous equations, the result is:  
  +  12 ℴ	 
	  =    − 	 	!  (8) 
Dividing by dt and rearranging, the Black – Scholes – Merton equation emerges:  
  + 12 	 
	 +  	 	 −   = 0 (9) 
Sometimes individual stocks will choose to pay out a dividend. While these dividends are in 
practice generally paid out on a particular day, they can be modeled as being paid out to the holder of 
the stock over a period of time. The effect on the Black Scholes equation is that this dividend reduces 
the amount of money that must be gained in order to meet the risk-free rate of return. Said another 
way, viewing the dividend as being paid continuously results in the asset itself paying out part of the 
risk-free rate that the delta hedger is attempting to reach. Introducing a continuous and constant 
dividend of D, the option price becomes: 
  + 12 	 
	
 +   − #	 	 −   = 0 (10) 
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Traders often refer to the ‘Greeks’ as the symbols that represent forces that affect options 
prices. These are simply the names for the various coefficients in the Black-Scholes-Merton dependent 
variables. The coefficients are rho (
 $ ), theta  %  , gamma (&&, and delta (. Vega (ℴ) is a 
parameter. While the impact of a dividend ( 
 ' ) has a very significant impact on options prices it is 
seldom used because for most stable periods, D is fixed. Theta is the time decay per day of an option as 
it approaches expiry. Delta is the change in the value of the option relative to the change in the 
underlying. Gamma is rate of change of delta. Vega is the change in value of the option with respect to 
volatility.  
Variations of the Black-Scholes-Merton equation dominate modern options pricing theory
6
. The 
observant reader will note that while the drift term in the underlying was included in the original asset 
movement, it is nowhere to be found in the final options price. This is extremely significant because it 
frees market makers from the extraordinary task of having to estimate a drift term. Moreover, it is 
entirely counterintuitive that a drift term does not appear in the final solution. Since options represent a 
dramatically increased chance for gains and losses when the asset moves in a direction, the drift term 
seems like it should appear in the equation. However, because of delta hedging, if a drift term appeared 
in options prices, arbitrageurs would simply take advantage of it by shorting (or buying) whatever was 
necessary to move the option price into equilibrium.  
While elegant and powerful, this formula is based on many assumptions. These assumptions 
were known to be false at the time of the inception of the formula. What recent research has shown is 
that violations of the assumptions have significant effects on the results. As will be shown, recent 
research shows that some of these assumptions might not be true or only holds within certain bounds. 
                                                           
6
 Black considered Merton’s replicating portfolio argument to be so important that Black insisted that Merton’s 
name be included when citing the model. 
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Amending some of these assumptions may present what are called “alpha opportunities” (a CAPM 
based reference). Alpha opportunities simply represent a risk adjusted proportion of the amount that a 
portfolio outperforms its benchmark, commonly the S&P 500. The excess return of a fund or investor is 
the amount of alpha that a fund achieved. For example, an alpha of .05 means that a fund outperformed 
its benchmark by 5% for the time period in question, generally a year.     
Black-Scholes-Merton Assumptions 
These assumptions have varying degrees of validity and relevance to this paper. The following 
discussion will cover how current research relates to these assumptions. The following are some of the 
key assumptions of the Black-Scholes-Merton equation: 
1. The underlying follows a lognormal random walk. 
2. Delta hedging is done continuously.  
3. There are no transaction costs.  
4. There are no arbitrage opportunities.  
5. Volatility is deterministic. 
6. The risk-free interest rate is a deterministic function of time.  
 
The underlying follows a lognormal random walk. 
One of the assumptions of the Black-Scholes-Merton model is that equity asset prices are a 
path-independent random walk or at least only weakly path-dependent in the case of American 
options
7
. The assertion that assets are martingales is a common one in finance and is not without its 
merits. However, a majority of the recent literature has found that technical analysis does in fact hold 
predictive power (Kirkpatrick, 2007). The main problem with much of this research is that it is often 
                                                           
7
 American options can be transformed into free boundary diffusion problems. 
13 
 
difficult and therefore pursued with inappropriate methods. Early attempts were highly subjective and 
often relied very heavily on surveying technical analysts. Two problems in particular, avoiding data 
snooping and correctly defining technical patterns can cause problems for researchers.  
Rising in remarkable contrast to earlier efforts, the work of Lo presents an example of how well-
done research can avoid methodological pitfalls and still find positive results for technical analysis. First, 
reasonable mathematically rigorous definitions of technical patterns were developed
8
. Then many 
different assets were tested to see if the distribution of their price movement after the formation of 
technical patterns was significantly different than the distribution of asset movements that occurred 
after technical patterns did not form. The results showed that technical patterns did contain information 
and that assets did behave in a predictably different way after technical patterns had formed. This result 
was ascertained with a variation in the spirit of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test conditioned on the testing 
of technical patterns based on rigorous definitions. Given these results, the use of technical patterns in 
trading may provide significant alpha opportunities in stocks (Lo, 2000).  
In a different study only focused on the use of head and shoulders patters in the S&P 500 and 
Russell 2000 index, the bearish use of the head and shoulders pattern was found to increase risk 
adjusted returns by 5-7% per year. This result was obtained by putting on short positions while a head 
and shoulders pattern appeared to be forming and exiting when the stock had reached a pre-defined 
minimum (Savin, 2007). The pre-defined maxima and minima drawn from rigorous definitions of 
technical patterns constitute technical barriers. The effect of barriers on asset price movement, rather 
than identifying new patterns themselves, will be the primary subject of this paper.  
                                                           
8
 Part of the development of these patterns was done in conjunction with leading human technical analysts. Some 
of the definitions of patterns were changed on the basis of these interviews.  
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Many academics immediately balk at the prospect of technical analysts and pictures of assets 
impacting their future movement. Those same academics would often not find it surprising if an asset 
was in fact an AR (12) process. These two arguments are founded on the same idea, namely that past 
asset movement can be used to model future asset movement. After Lo sets out clear definitions for 
technical patterns, the only difference is that one is non-parametric while the other is parametric. 
Framed in this context, technical analysis seems much more reasonable. (Lo, 2000)  
However, technical analysis appears to have its limits. It has been shown that technical patterns 
formed on an intraday basis do not appear to have predictive power. This result was attained by using a 
bootstrapping method to test 7,846 technical patterns. During these tests, none of the patterns 
exhibited predictive power on an intra-day level (Marshall, 2008).  
Having established that peer-reviewed evidence supports the conclusion that even with 
impressive tests like this, technical patterns do have some predictive power for asset movement, our 
attention shifts to understanding what market forces are causing those technical patterns to form. The 
most compelling answer to that question is that the depth of the limit order book underpins technical 
patterns. Essentially, traders put stop limit orders around technical barriers and thereby create the self-
fulfilling prophecy that an asset is more likely to stay within a certain range than would be suggested by 
a purely random walk. (Kavajecz, 2004)  
The existence of stops is not only justified from a supply and demand standpoint. Both long and 
short traders use stops as a form of risk management. Traders who are long the position use lower-
bound stops to limit losses while short traders should have stops on the upper side to prevent extreme 
losses. O’Neil and Faith both provide good examples of risk management strategies of this sort (O’Neil 
2002, Faith, 2007).  
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It follows that if the underlying has an unusual probability distribution after technical patterns 
have formed, then options prices might reflect that probability shift. In the same way that supply and 
demand for the asset reinforces technical patterns, I postulate supply and demand dynamics around 
technical patterns may impact options prices. If practitioners recognize a shift in the probability of an 
asset price movement in the form of a technical barrier, then they will have a greater incentive to 
purchase calls or puts (depending on their view) around that technical barrier than they would normally.  
The presence of a technical barrier presents an excellent point of examination for speculation. 
While options prices cannot get too high or low because of hedging, options may vary significantly in 
value to speculators based on their views of the markets. If a speculator believes that an asset will break 
a technical barrier, then calls above that barrier are worth more to them than someone who believes 
the opposite. This creates a situation where, given divergent market views, two individuals could easily 
come together with dramatically different market views (Wilmott, 2006) to make a trade with neither 
party necessarily taking part in a hedging process. Given the extremely low options volumes on thinly 
traded securities, it is clear that this takes place on a regular basis because delta hedging in an 
environment where options of a particular strike have a daily volume of 0 is not difficult; it’s impossible.  
These dynamics will never-the-less be affected by Black-Scholes-Merton arguments. Supply and 
demand forces would naturally increase the value of puts when there is fear in the market of a 
significant crash. If the increased price in puts was too large, arbitrageurs would take advantage of the 
discrepancy and counter the impact disequilibrium within supply and demand dynamics. As such, supply 
and demand creates alterations in the implied volatility surface but those variations are limited by the 
ability of arbitrageurs to take advantage of these opportunities. The ability of arbitrageurs to take 
advantage of this is directly related to their ability to continuously hedge, their ability to deal with jump 
16 
 
diffusions, and transaction costs. Combined, these factors do not invalidate the Black-Scholes-Merton 
formula but merely give it a range that it can fluctuate within.  
Further compounding the problem is the fact that assets often do not move in a continuous 
fashion. There are often jumps in these processes that can significantly alter the prices of options 
(Wilmott, 2006). This degree of jump diffusion, a concept to be defended presently, in an asset has been 
shown to impact its price. One can observe this effect particularly well in options that are close to expiry 
(Gatheral, 2006). Evidence from the S&P 500 shows that index is a combination of both continuous and 
jump processes (Carr, 2003). For the remainder of this paper, jump diffusion processes will be defined 
using the following parameters: 
Drawing from the notation of Gatheral, 2006, the base of the movement of the asset will be taken as a 
lognormal random walk:  
 	 =  	 +  	 (11) 
To add a jump process, a jump of size J such that the asset jumps from S to JS will be added 
 	 =  	 +  	 + ( − 1	) (12) 
This jump will be governed by Poisson process: 
 ) = 0 *+ℎ -./0/+1+2 .3 1 − ℷ (13) 
 ) = 1 *+ℎ -./0/+1+2 .3 ℷ (14) 
It will also be assumed that the Poisson process dq and the Brownian motion dS are independent.  
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Delta hedging is done continuously and there are no transaction costs 
In practice, continuous delta hedging is impossible because it takes time both for orders to fill 
and because there are transaction costs. Additionally, a key source of market inefficiency is the difficulty 
and time invested in making trading decisions (Mehlring, 2005). Discrete time hedging is possible and 
occurs in practice but introduces a variety of complexities (Wilmott 2006). Ultimately, discrete time 
hedging does not eliminate risk in practice but rather offers the best possible elimination of risk. In 
particular, there is often significant exposure to gamma during this process. This stems from the fact 
that as gamma increases (which happens quickly when the asset is moving quickly), the amount that the 
delta-hedger is off increases. This leads to the possibility of loss due to the fact that the trader can no 
longer hedge continuously (Gatheral, 2006).  
Additionally, there are almost always transaction costs of various sizes. These transaction costs 
can impact the kinds of strategies that traders pursue in markets (Wilmott, 2006). On top of that, 
illiquidity of options can impact their prices (Brenner, 2001) as some command permits or discounts for 
the liquidity.  
As shown in the Hoggard-Whalley-Wilmott equation (Wilmott, 2006), it is possible and 
important to take into account that portfolios cannot in fact be hedged continuously and that there are 
in fact transaction costs. Their derivation of these effects is as follows:  
In discrete time, the stochastic equation of the movement of the asset is:  
 	 =  	  +  	 (15) 
It is replaced by: 
 
5	 =  	5 +  	6√5 
(16) 
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The ‘hedged’ portfolio as shown by: 
 Π = 	,  −  Δ	 (17) 
However, it must be recognized that hedging must be done over some finite amount of time 5. 
After a time 5, the portfolio value becomes: 
 5Π = 	 + 5	,  +  5 −  Δ	 + 5	 −  	,  +  Δ	 (18) 
Moving from the discretization problem, to the transaction cost problem, the transaction cost of 
any hedge is set equal to: 8	|:| where k is the transaction costs and v is the volume of the trade. This 
assumption is strong because it assumes that the cost of a move is a constant k for any given v but falls 
short because sometimes k can vary with v. In particular, large institutions can get significant discounts 
for large transactions as well as the degree of leverage they may put on a particular trade (Lowensten, 
2001). It also omits any costs incurred that are associated with the bid-ask spread. Continuing the 
derivation, the quantity v of the underlying asset that is bought is given by the change in the delta from 
one time step to the next: 
 : = 55	 	 + 5	,  + 5 − 55	 	,  (19) 
This can be approximated by:  
 : = 55	 + 5/5	5	 + 5/5	55 + ⋯ 5/5	 (20) 
Subtracting the costs from the change in the portfolio value, taking the mean of that, and then choosing 
Δ = <<   , it can be shown that the Hoggard-Whalley-Wilmott equations is9: 
                                                           
9
 For a more in depth and step by step approach, see Wilmott, 2006.  
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 55 +
12 	55	 −  8	= 25! | 5/5	| + 	55	 −   =  0 
 
(21) 
There are no arbitrage opportunities.  
In practice, arbitrage opportunities exist and many traders make a living exploiting them. When 
an arbitrage appears, arbitrage traders seek to profit from and correct the arbitrage as quickly as 
possible. If arbitrage traders did not attempt to do this, systematic arbitrage opportunities would exist 
but no one would take advantage of them. As system-wide arbitrage does not appear to exist and 
arbitrage traders do exist, we come to a place where an individual arbitrage opportunity may exist but 
only for a very short period of time (Wilmott, 2006). In practice, taking advantage of these opportunities 
can be extremely profitable but if done without regard to sound risk management strategies, can be 
disastrous (Lowenstein, 2001).  
Delta-hedgers seeking arbitrage expose themselves to a variety of risks. The first kind of risk is 
jump diffusion processes. If there is a jump, an active hedging strategy may actually result in a very 
significant loss. The total inability of delta hedging to work in practice during the great crash of 1987 or 
when markets were shut down after September 11
th
 is a great example of this. Transaction cost risk is 
also important for people who are trying to hedge continuously. Even if a trader can hedge the jumps, if 
changes occur frequently enough, the transaction costs associated with the trade may move the trader 
into a loss even though the strategy was maintained.  
Volatility is a deterministic process. 
The Black-Scholes-Merton formula assumes that volatility is a deterministic process. While it is 
possible to make models that estimate actual volatility (Barndorff-Nielsen, 2002), it is difficult for any 
model to fully handle the jump processes that occur so frequently in financial markets. Modeling local 
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volatilities produces results that are not consistent with real movements in the implied volatility surface 
(Dumas, 1998). Unfortunately, this has not stopped some practitioners from using them. These realities 
lead to treating volatility as a random stochastic process (Wilmott, 2006). One way to deal with this 
problem is to model the stochastic implied volatility surface rather than the true volatility surface 
(Schonbucher, 1999). A more common, and computationally easier, way to deal with stochastic volatility 
is to use the Heston model (Hull 1987, Gatheral, 2006). Heston’s model describes volatility as a mean-
reverting process that, in and of itself, exhibits a certain amount of random variation. There are two 
major problems with the Heston model. While it does have a good fit for prices that have a long time 
until expiration, it does not perform as well for options with shorter times to expiry. Second, it is 
unstable over time (Gatheral, 2006). Despite these problems, its computational efficiency makes it 
popular among practitioners.  
Assuming parameters can be properly calibrated and are stable, this can be dealt with by the 
Heston model and other stochastic volatility models (Gatheral, 2006). This study asserts any complete 
explanation must incorporate changes in supply and demand for options, which this study posits, is 
driven by speculation within Black-Scholes-Merton bands. The theory that options prices are in part 
determined in part by supply and demand was actually posited by Black himself when he was first trying 
to solve for options prices (Mehlring, 2005). Since double tops and bottoms present a location where 
the future movement of a price series is shifted, technical barriers present a unique opportunity for 
examining supply and demand dynamics for options has presented itself.  
The risk-free interest rate is a function of time  
Beyond the effects of changing assumptions about the underlying asset, a minor part of the 
Black-Scholes-Merton formula is the relationship between interest rates and options valuations. 
Stochastic interest may also produce interesting effects when introduced into options pricing. However, 
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the effect of stochastic interest rates is much more important in fixed income and fixed income 
derivative derivatives than it is in equity options pricing and will not be a major subject of this paper. 
The impact of interest rates on options contracts is relatively small in size, as measured by the 
parameter sensitivity rho which is expressed by > = $.  
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Data 
 
The options data used in this study came from the brokerage firm ThinkorSwim. Unfortunately, 
the options prices we have access to are only given at close of day levels. This is not ideal because 
options prices alter slightly as trading drops off (further evidence for the conjecture of supply and 
demand playing a role) and so this may lead to some errors in measurement. However it appears 
reasonable that the differences between close of day prices and options prices during the day are not a 
significant enough problem to deter us from further investigation. Having said that, high-frequency 
analysis may prove fruitful in future research. All asset price data that was not options related came 
from finance.yahoo.com. Price series garnered from this source included closing values for the SPX, SPY, 
and VIX.  
The SPX is simply the value of the S&P 500. As it is a number rather than a commodity, it has no 
volume. In order to compensate for this, data from the SPY was incorporated. The SPY is an exchange 
traded fund whose value is designed to match that of the SPX. Because it is a traded commodity, it has 
volume which can be used for analysis. SPY closing data was not used because it can deviate by small 
amount from the SPX during times of high levels of volatility. The VIX is a general measure of implied 
volatility for SPX options. Large fluctuations in the VIX can disrupt the vega hedges taken by delta-
hedgers. Increases in the VIX lead to higher premiums paid for all options, including protective puts. The 
Federal Funds rate was taken as the risk free rate and retrieved from the New York Federal Reserve’s 
website.  
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Analysis 
The Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
 Many academics hold that there is no long-term strategy that can beat the market. This line of 
thinking assumes that everything that occurs in the market is already ‘priced in’ and therefore no 
strategy can produce risk adjusted excess returns in the CAPM sense in the long run. Technical analysis 
runs completely contrary to this view. Technical analysts believe that is possible to follow market trends. 
For technical analysts, the term trend does not generally refer to a structural, permanent drift 
component of an econometric model. This language barrier has made bridging the gap between 
academic econometricians and practitioners difficult. Rather, to a technical analyst, a trend refers to the 
‘momentum’ of an asset in a particular direction. To that end, multiple trends can exist simultaneously 
over different durations. 
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Figure 1: 2008 Bear Market Rally 
 
 
 The simplest example of this is a bear market rally. During a bear market, the market is 
considered to be in a long-term (the definition of which varies greatly) downtrend but in a short-term 
uptrend. In this way, using different time horizons, two analysts, using the same methodology could say 
we are both in an uptrend and a downtrend. This does not invalidate either measure. As would be 
expected, short-term uptrends are generally thought to have less long-term predictive power than their 
longer term counterparts. In practice, uptrends and downtrends are often classified by going above or 
below certain duration moving averages. These moving averages act as a crude way to objectively 
determine if the momentum or first derivative of an asset is positive or negative. Therefore, before 
moving forward, it is illustrative to show a painfully simple trading strategy that dramatically 
outperforms the market over the last 39 years of market history.  
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 The strategy is as follows. Go long the S&P 500 (SPX) every time that the 10 day moving average 
is above the 400 trading day moving average and going short the SPX every time the 10 trading day 
moving average is below the 400 trading day moving average. The logic behind this move is that a trader 
wants to be long the market when its momentum is positive and short it when it is not. This strategy 
captures long-term trends in the markets and allows the trader to capitalize on this quite generously and 
with few transaction costs.  
 Pursuing this strategy starting on 8/1/1963
10
, an investor would have conducted a total of 46 
transactions (assuming that shorts were taken for very long durations), or roughly one transaction per 
year. As of 10/10/2008, a simple buy and hold strategy would have resulted in a net profit of 1294% (not 
adjusted for inflation) while the 400 day moving average strategy would have netted a 3411% net gain 
over the same period. This startlingly simple strategy would have protected one’s investments from the 
brunt of both the dot com bubble and the 2008 collapse. The notion that markets do not have profitable 
trends is significantly challenged by this example.  
  
                                                           
10
 This date was chosen because that is when reliable data on 400 day moving average of the SPX begins.  
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A Crude Estimator Produces Results 
  
 The investigation begins with a very simple question: Do short-term technical barriers act as a 
short-term turning point? To answer this question, a simple T-test was performed to see if the 3 day 
moving average (of the S&P 500) formed after a technical barrier differed significantly from the previous 
15 day moving average. The most significant problem with this approach is that it will pick up a 
mitigation of a previous trend rather than a reversal as a significant event. True turning points are what 
technical analysts are particularly interested in finding and in this way the study may identify some cases 
that practitioners might not be satisfied with. However, demanding a true structural change after the 
formation of a technical pattern is an extremely high bar to set for an automated test. Therefore, this 
test offers an excellent starting point for determining what use crude estimators are in identifying 
double tops.  This essentially tests for a brief ‘bounce’ off a double top or a double bottom and says little 
about any structural shift in the process. A clear visual example of a double top that exhibits both a 
strong 3 day ‘bounce’ as well as a significant trend change following a double top is the following graph 
from the Russell 2000 Index. 
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Figure 2: Example Double Top from Trading Software Output 
 
A variety of sophisticated techniques, including Kernel regressions (Lo, 2000) have been shown 
to have value in producing smoothed estimators which offer insights that crude estimators do not. 
However, in practice, crude estimators are often used by market participants. The most obvious version 
of a crude estimator is a technical analyst’s interpretation of an unaltered price chart. These charts are 
regularly cited on a variety of finance programs and are available on virtually every major trading 
platform. For this reason, an investigation as to whether or not crude estimators can offer insight into 
technical analysis is of interest to both academics and active traders.    
Following the principles and metrics, although not the exact algorithm, laid out in Lo’s work (Lo, 
2000), a double top will simply be defined as a new maximum that occurs at least 10 days after a 
previous maximum from a 38 day window and is within 1% of the average of the previous maximum and 
100.5% of the original maximum. A double bottom is defined as a new minimum that occurs at least 10 
The above line is a double top. 
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days after a previous minimum from a 38 day window and is within 1% of the average of the previous 
maximum and 99.5% of the original minimum.   
My approach primarily differs from Lo’s in that Lo used a shifting cumulative density function in 
the spirit of Kolmogorov-Smirnov while I employ simple T-tests to test for changes in pattern formations. 
Our choice in favor of T-tests partially stems from the fact that I have chosen to use unsmoothed closing 
prices for our analysis. Also, whereas kernel regression can be highly computationally expensive, a T-test 
is tractable for many actual participants. This is a legitimate extension of previous work because it will 
answer the question of whether smoothing is necessary for the successful study of technical barriers.  
 Before moving on, a simple PDF (probability distribution function) of asset movements before 
and after the formation of a double bottom will prove illustrative. In this figure, I use inter-day 
minimums and maxima to define a technical bottom for a 38 day window. The decision to use inter-day 
prices will be justified by results later in the paper. I then plot the PDF of the 15 day slope of the SPX 
before and after the formation of a double bottom. The resulting PDF appears to show that there is a 
significant shift in the PDF before and after the formation of this pattern. This shifted distribution 
motivates many of the investigations in this paper and is generally significant in raising our interest as 
researchers in this topic.  
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Figure 3: Distribution of 15 Day Slopes for SPX Movement before and After Formation of 
Double Bottoms from 1988-2008 
 
 Theoretically, the presence of a double top or a double bottom should still hold power during a 
structural up-trend or a structural down-trend respectively. In order to test this, I will subject these 
patterns to the most rigorous case of this: an extremely fast uptrend or downtrend. During an extremely 
strong uptrend or downtrend, techncials would, intuitively, be the most likely to be broken through. For 
our purposes, I will allow a structural uptrend be defined as the 5 day moving average being above 105% 
of the 200 day moving average. A structural downtrend is defined by the same argument but being 
below 95% of the 200 day moving average. Alternatively, I will allow a short-term uptrend to be defined 
as the 5 day moving average being above 105% of the 50 day moving average. Similarly, I define a short-
term downtrend will be defined as being at 95% or lower of the 50 day moving average. Allowing for 
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both definitions will give insights into the behavior of double tops and double bottoms during extremely 
strong short-term and long-term trends.  
When interpreting these results, one should note that these processes may produce results that 
are heteroskedastic in nature which invalidates T-tests to some extent. Beyond that, the series studied 
may not be stationary. Modeling these processes as GARCH processes presents a very reasonable 
possibility for future research. However, for our purposes, the T-test will serve as a statistical heuristic. 
Using a T-test as a statistical heuristic is superior to calculating simple averages but certainly could be 
improved upon by future research.  Other future research should also expand beyond the SPX
11
. This is 
primarily because the search for optimal window lengths ends up re-sampling the same data repeatedly. 
The best solution to this is for researchers to conduct similar studies with different price series.  
Additionally, T-tests are fairly sensitive to sample size. Given that some technical patterns do not 
occur very frequently, this is an important consideration. Another major problem with the T-test is that 
asset returns are very frequently non-normal in their distribution. Additionally, they often exhibit 
leptokurtosis. While the T-distribution is indeed leptokurtotic, it asymptotically mesokurtotic. The result 
is that as more data strengthens the test, the distribution becomes increasingly appropriate.  
The major advantage of a T-test is that it can be easily computed and compared over a long 
series of windows. Perhaps most importantly, a T-test for a difference in means allows the researcher to 
measure the actual differences in means between movement before and after a technical barrier 
without biasing the results in a way that merely rewards risk taking. A system that simply calculates 
long/short profits from using technicals raises serious concerns about how much the trader is being 
‘paid’ for trading around what are assumed to be volatile points. By calculating the difference between 
                                                           
11
 In general, index data in general is most likely to yield price series that do not receive a great deal of interference 
from earnings events and other news related jump points that could interfere with the identification of technical 
barriers.  
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the average daily percent change in a series before and after the completion of a double top or bottom, 
the test avoids this bias.  
An observation of a profitable trading pattern may simply come from moving up along the 
risk/reward continuum. In the same way that one would expect stocks to exhibit both a higher rate of 
return and volatility of returns than a bond-based portfolio, it might be the case that traders trading 
around technical barriers have higher yields because they are taking great risks at market turning points. 
Simply comparing asset direction before and after a technical barrier frees us from such biases and 
allows true investigation into the changes in the distribution of asset prices before and after the 
formation of technical barriers
12
. The results of the previously described T-tests for the identification of 
technical barriers are shown below.  
Figure 4: T-Test Measuring the Impact of a Double Top During a Short-term Structural 
Uptrend (50 day Moving Average) on the Future 3 Day Moving Average Divergence from the 
Past 15 Day Moving Average 
  Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
3 Day Average Percent Change After Double Top -0.0001924 0.0051551 165 
15 Day Moving Average Before Double Top 0.0004975 0.0006838 165 
Difference -0.0006898 0.0051557 165 
  
   Probability 3 Future Average < 15 Day Past Average 0.0438 T = -1.72 DF = 164 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
12
 This logic was drawn from Lo, 2000.  
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Figure 5: T-Test Measuring the Impact of a Double Top During a Long-term Structural Uptrend 
(200 day Moving Average) on the Future 3 Day Moving Average Divergence from the Past 15 
Day Moving Average 
  Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
3 Day Average Percent Change After Double Top -0.000335 0.0048298 168 
15 Day Moving Average Before Double Top 0.0004625 0.0006571 168 
Difference -0.0007975 0.0048549 168 
  
   Probability 3 Day Future Average < 15 Day Past 
Average 0.0174 T = -2.13 DF = 167 
 
Figure 6: T-Test Measuring the Impact of a Double Bottom During a Short-term Structural 
Uptrend (50 day Moving Average) on the Future 3 Day Moving Average Divergence from the 
Past 15 Day Moving Average 
  Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
3 Day Average Percent Change After Double 
Bottom -0.0000702 0.0044193 17 
15 Day Moving Average Before Double Bottom -0.0007771 0.0009158 17 
Difference 0.0007068 0.0044546 17 
  
   Probability 3 Day Future Average > 15 Day Past 
Average 0.2611 T = .654 DF = 16 
 
Figure 7: T-Test Measuring the Impact of a Double Bottom During a Long-term Structural 
Uptrend (200 day Moving Average) on the Future 3 Day Moving Average Divergence from the 
Past 15 Day Moving Average 
  Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
3 Day Average Percent Change After Double 
Bottom 0.0006053 0.0049371 57 
15 Day Moving Average Before Double Bottom -0.0006524 0.0010098 57 
Difference 0.0012577 0.0049506 57 
  
   Probability 3 Day Future Average > 15 Day Past 
Average 0.0301 T = 1.92 DF = 56 
 
 These results show that even during an uptrend, a crude indicator of a double top is significant 
(p=.043) for a one-sided T-test for a short-term moving average and correctly predicts a decline in the 
short-term moving average. Double tops appear to be more reliable during longer term uptrends with 
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both the neutral (p=.034) and the one-sided (p=.017) T-tests yielding significant results. The results for 
double bottoms during short-term uptrends are surprisingly insignificant. This may be attributed to the 
fact that only 17 of these double bottoms formed from the period of 1980-2008. The formation of a 
double bottom during a short-term (50 moving average) uptrend may indicate that support for the rally 
is weak and requires a dramatic reversal. Encouragingly, a one-sided T-test shows that a double bottom 
performs as a short-term turning point during long-term structural uptrends (p=.03). The following 
results replicate the previous T-tests but for periods of downtrends instead of uptrends. 
Figure 8: T-Test Measuring the Impact of a Double Bottom During a Short-term Structural 
Downtrend (50 day Moving Average) on the Future 3 Day Moving Average Divergence from 
the Past 15 Day Moving Average 
  Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
3 Day Average Percent Change After Double 
Bottom 0.0019298 0.0065097 20 
15 Day Moving Average Before Double Bottom -0.001013 0.0007292 20 
Difference 0.0029428 0.0067628 20 
  
   Probability 3 Day Future Average > 15 Day Past 
Average 0.0333 T = 1.95 DF = 19 
 
Figure 9: T-Test Measuring the Impact of a Double Bottom During a Long-term Structural 
Downtrend (200 day Moving Average) on the Future 3 Day Moving Average Divergence from 
the Past 15 Day Moving Average 
  Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
3 Day Average Percent Change After Double 
Bottom 0.0017418 0.0061942 39 
15 Day Moving Average Before Double Bottom -0.000715 0.0010369 39 
Difference 0.0024568 0.0064688 39 
  
   Probability 3 Day Future Average > 15 Day Past 
Average 0.0114 T = 2.37 DF = 38 
 
 
 
34 
 
Figure 10: T-Test Measuring the Impact of a Double Top During a Short-term Structural 
Downtrend (50 day Moving Average) on the Future 3 Day Moving Average Divergence from 
the Past 15 Day Moving Average 
  Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
3 Day Average Percent Change After Double Top 0.0000313 0.005957 2 
15 Day Moving Average Before Double Top 0.0008139 0.0001529 2 
Difference 
-
0.0007826 0.0058041 2 
  
   Probability 3 Day Future Average < 15 Day Past 
Average 0.44 T = -.191 DF = 1 
 
Figure 11: T-Test Measuring the Impact of a Double Top During a Long-term Structural 
Downtrend (200 day Moving Average) on the Future 3 Day Moving Average Divergence from 
the Past 15 Day Moving Average 
  Mean Std. Dev. Observations 
3 Day Average Percent Change After Double Top 0.0014684 0.0057683 19 
15 Day Moving Average Before Double Top 0.0004699 0.0007427 19 
Difference 0.0009985 0.0060139 19 
  
   Probability 3 Day Future Average < 15 Day Past 
Average 0.76 T = .724 DF = 18 
 
Double bottoms still hold significance at the .05 level during both short-term and long-term 
structural downtrends. This is particularly encouraging because downtrends are precisely the sort of 
period where double bottoms might be prone to fail and therefore not provide information on the 
future movement of asset prices. Unfortunately, double tops simply do not form very frequently during 
very strong structural downtrends. During short-term structural downtrends, double tops do not form 
often (using the crude definition) and consequently the results are difficult to interpret. The fact that 
they do not appear to have predictive power is colored by the small number of observations available 
and heteroskedastic asymptotics.  
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The Windowing Question 
 
 Having established that technical patterns do exhibit some predictive power over a 38 day 
window, our attention turns to one of the key questions in technical analysis: window length selection. 
Window length selection is critical to the identification of technical analysis. However, a method for 
establishing the appropriate window length has yet to be determined (Lo, 2000). I attack this problem by 
attempting to identify those periods in which technical barriers provide the most significant information 
on future asset movement. This method does have elements of data snooping in it simply because 
future data is used to determine the validity of a technique. However, it is reasonable to argue that this 
exercise is primarily calibration for a few reasons.  
First, it is not technical analysis generally that is being argued for here but rather a very specific 
element of technical analysis: window length. Second, the majority of the tests done are done without 
an attempt to justify totally new parameters for technical patterns and in doing so bias the results of the 
selection of the new parameter. In this way, the methodology conforms more to the definition of 
calibration rather than data snooping. Technical information will be identified by both significant T-tests 
for divergence of trends after the formation of a barrier as well as a simple metric of how often a barrier 
results in a sign change of the trend
13
.  
 Test windows lengths will range from a 10 day window to a 500 day window. Going beyond the 
500 day window is difficult simply because the number of times that technical barriers form for window 
lengths that long is very small. Examining a window shorter than 10 days borders on analysis of one hour 
and other minute charts and therefore is close to the examination of day trading which this study is not 
                                                           
13
 Such a sign would indicate a switch from an uptrend to a downtrend or vice versa. 
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concerned with. Having established that time frame, I move to an analysis of how often each sort of 
technical pattern emerges for a given window.   
 However, before beginning analysis of the impact of technical barriers on the SPX, the null case 
of simple Brownian motion with drift was analyzed to see if the subsequent results for the SPX price 
series can also be found in Brownian motion. The Brownian motion series in question is simply a 
Brownian motion with the drift and standard deviation term found in the SPX from 1/1/1988 to 
10/10/2008. Unfortunately, sufficient computational power was not available to estimate the very large 
number of these series that would be necessary to perform a true Monte Carlo simulation. However, a 
few series were tested and the results were mixed and point to the need for future simulations with a 
much larger numbers of series.  
 First and most encouragingly, all of the results for testing for the significance of double tops in 
the expected direction (down) formed an insignificant number of significant p-values
14
 for the window 
lengths (10 to 500 days) in question. This indicates that a double top in a Brownian series does not 
provide information about the future movement of an asset when the process is simple Brownian 
motion with drift.  
However, there were a number of series that produced statistically significant results for double 
bottoms over a variety of windows. The most rational explanation for this is that the positive drift term 
that is uniformly present through the simulation resulted in the following occurrence creating 
‘significant’ double bottoms. The presence of a positive drift term makes the level of downturn 
necessary to create a double bottom statistically unlikely to occur. However, when it does occur, it 
would be an unlikely event (for the time window in question as a whole) for the asset to continue in a 
downward path consistent with the breaking of a double bottom in spite of its positive drift term. 
                                                           
14
 Additional information about the methodology for determining significance follows.  
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Instead, the general upward drift term takes over making it appear that the double bottom was an 
effective barrier when in reality it was just the drift term moving the asset up.  
Therefore it is unsurprising that Brownian motion with positive drift would tend to go up after 
going down because it always will tend to go up due to the drift term. After all, since its path is not 
determined by previous results, finding wholly insignificant results using this definition of a double 
bottom would be surprising. Also, using T-tests to test for differences in slope are prone to the naturally 
heteroskedastic process of Brownian motion. Additionally, as noted earlier, rigorous simulations with 
hundreds or thousands of series would be necessary to create definitive conclusions about the miss-
identification of double bottoms in Brownian motion which naturally trends upwards over a significantly 
long period of time.  
One of the most unrealistic parts of this simulation is that the drift term for the SPX is not 
uniformly positive across all time windows. Instead there are periods, such as the crashes of the 1930’s, 
2001-2002, and 2008, during which it is quite clear that the drift (or in the language of technical 
analysts, trend) of the series is in fact quite negative, at least for a short bust significant time window. 
For those arguing that the long run drift for all stock markets of industrialized nations is necessarily 
positive for all time periods, noting the 20 year path of the Japanese stock market is of significant value. 
From 1989 to 2009, its net movement was - 74%. Therefore, the notion of a constant and positive drift 
term as the basis for such a simulation is simply not necessarily a correct assumption and raises serious 
questions about the validity of the counter-intuitive findings regarding double bottoms.  
What would be a much stronger simulation of the stock market would be to make the drift term 
a function of the immediate past movement of the stock market. Unfortunately, this directly interferes 
with the entire concept of random motion that is unconditional on past returns. Finding an alternative 
null case for technical analysts to be measured against rather than simple Brownian motion with upward 
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drift remains an important field for future research. The determination of such a base case will not only 
be useful to financial analysts as a whole but will go a long way to substantiating to what extent the 
success of double bottoms is a function of true market indicators or simply a function of the positive 
drift term. 
Having discussed the impact of technical barriers and the future price movement of the asset, it 
is of interest how often these Brownian series form technical barriers in comparison to the SPX. To do 
this, two Brownian motion series with drift were tested for the presence of double tops and bottoms 
and then the frequency of how often those patterns formed was recorded. For comparison purposes, 
this was then compared to the SPX. 
Figure 12: Formation of Technical Barriers for Brownian Motion vs. SPX Price 
Series 
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There are a few differences that are of note between the Brownian series and the SPX series. 
First the intercept (at window length = 10 days) for the SPX is markedly higher than its Brownian 
counterparts. The SPX series’ rate of decline is also faster than its Brownian counterparts. This results in 
a terminal value (window length = 500) that is lower than their Brownian counterparts. Also, the SPX 
series decreases fairly uniformly over time whereas Brownian series 1 has times when the frequency of 
pattern formation actually increases. These results point to the finding that the SPX is relatively range-
bound compared to these Brownian series. This would provide support for both the thesis that the SPX 
is not a purely random walk and/or that there needs to be the re-estimation of a drift term throughout 
the series instead of just keeping one drift term constant over time. Similar to before, Monte Carlo 
simulations presenting true confidence intervals for how often technical barriers should be forming for a 
given series would also be of interest for future research. Having examined these interesting but 
inconclusive null cases, our attention will now exclusively center of the SPX. This analysis begins with an 
analysis of how often a given technical pattern forms over a given time window.   
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Figure 13: Percent of Time Double Tops and Double Bottoms Form in a Given Window Length 
 
 This chart shows that the shorter the window length is, the more frequently a given pattern will 
occur. Clearly, technical patterns that form on 40% of all days (as does the 10 day double top category) 
are immediately suspect.  However, patterns that form on 5, 10, or 15 percent of all days may be more 
in line with intuition of what a meaningful pattern is because they are more easily recognizable to 
traders. This level of appearance begins at a 30 day trading window but only reaches the 5% patter 
formation point at the significantly long length of 136 days. This does not mean that the smaller window 
lengths are insignificant. On the contrary, the results of simple T-tests indicate their value is quite 
significant. I only mentioned their frequency as a cautionary note on the following results.  
 In order to test for the impact of double tops and bottoms, a T-test examining the difference 
between a past slope of the line and the slope of the line after the formation of the technical pattern. 
For the initial tests, a two-tailed test was employed to avoid biasing statistical tests from theory. If the 
series is extremely leptokurtotic, having a baseline percent of p values that are significant will signal to 
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the researcher if a (seemingly) high percentage of p values for subsequent on-sided T-tests are in fact 
informative or not. For example, if the one tailed test was to find that 30% of all p-values in the 
expected direction were significant but a two tailed test for the same series showed that 80% of all 
values were significant, this would point to the fact that 50% of all p-values were significant in the 
completely opposite direction. Without the unbiased test first, there is a risk that subsequent tests may 
overlook important but glaring inconsistencies. Beyond that, it may be that trading off of technicals is 
actually a net losing strategy and a two-tailed test will pick part of that up in a way one-tailed tests 
would not. In subsequent results, one tailed tests in the expected direction will be employed. Here, the 
past 15 day slope (S) was defined as difference between the price (P) 15 days ago and the price 1 day 
ago divided by 15. The future slope of the asset was similarly defined. Three and thirty day slopes were 
computed using the same general methodology.   
 	 = ?%@A −  ?%@AB15  (22) 
I rejected more advanced methods for computing slopes because they are not as easily viewed 
by the naked eye. Since the crude estimator tests are designed to test those patterns which are easily 
observable to the naked eye, a simple slope is most appropriate. All other slopes were computed with 
the same method and only adjustments were made to the length of time being considered.  
To test for the power of technical barrier over various durations, the previous 15 day slope was 
compared to the future 3 day slope as well as the future 15 day slope. To get an even longer term look, 
the past 30 day slope was compared to the future 30 day slope. In addition to the slope, a simple 
average of the daily percent change of the underlying for the same periods were compared to the 
simple slope previously mentioned.
15
  
                                                           
15
 T-tests for the all comparisons shown below were done for the entirety of the sample and were found to be 
insignificant at the .2 level. This assures us that the past trend X day trend does not normally diverge from the next 
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 In order to check for significance, a binomial confidence interval was calculated. The N used in 
this calculation was the average number of times a pattern formed for any given window length during 
the period examined. For example, the N used to calculate the confidence bound for the p value for the 
double top indicator for the entire series is the average number of times a double top formed for every 
single window length examined. In contrast, the 6-month double top series represents only the average 
number of double tops formed during the window lengths examined from 10 to 127 days
16
 in length.  
Confidence intervals are smaller for the shorter window lengths because double tops and double 
bottoms are much more likely to form during these periods. Because this analysis employed a .05 test 
for significance, that forms the center for the binomial distribution and its ensuing confidence intervals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
X day trend by a statistically significant amount. Therefore, the subsequent results are not just a subset of a 
general divergence but of a true point of differentiation.  
16
 127 days is an appropriate half of a year because the SPX only has recorded vales on trading days which only 
occur on Monday through Friday, with certain holidays off.  
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Figure 14: Percent of All P Values That are Significant at the .05 Level for a Two-Tailed Test For 
Directional Change of Slope After the Formation of either a Double Top or a Double Bottom 
  Overall Double Top Average Overall Double Bottom Average Overall Average 
Average Daily Percent Change Overall 56.7%*** 52.5%*** 54.6%*** 
Simple Slope Overall 50.0%*** 47.2%*** 48.6%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (1.81%, 8.19%) (1.37%, 8.63%) (1.61%, 8.39%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 310 238 274 
 
   Average Daily Percent Change 6 months 41.0%*** 87.7%*** 64.4%*** 
Simple Slope 6 months 44.7%*** 81.5%*** 63.1%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (3.03%, 6.97%) (2.75%, 7.25%) (2.9%, 7.1%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 816 620 718 
 
   Average Daily Percent Change 6-12 months 90.7%*** 56.1%*** 73.4%*** 
Simple Slope 6-12 months 84.9%*** 53.7%*** 69.3%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (1.41%, 8.59%) (.94%, 9.06%) (1.2%, 8.8%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 245 191 218 
 
   Average Daily Percent Change 12+ months 46.8%*** 34.1%*** 40.5%*** 
Simple Slope 12+ months 34.8%*** 27.7%*** 31.3%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (-.51%, 10.51%) (-1.16%, 11.16%) (-.82%, 10.82%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 104 83 93 
* Significant at .1 Level 
** Significant at .05 Level 
***Significant at .01 Level 
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Figure 15: Detailed Breakdown of the Percent of All P Values That are Significant at the .05 
Level for a Two-Tailed Test For Directional Change of Slope After the Formation of A Double 
Top 
  Double Top 3 Day Double Top 15 Day Double Top 30 Day 
Average Daily Percent Change Overall 40.7%*** 64.0%*** 65.4%*** 
Simple Slope Overall 36.5%*** 54.0%*** 59.7%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (1.81%, 8.19%) (1.81%, 8.19%) (1.81%, 8.19%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 310 310 310 
    Average Daily Percent Change 6 months 30.8%*** 41.9%*** 50.4%*** 
Simple Slope 6 months 38.5%*** 36.8%*** 59.0%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (3.03%, 6.97%) (3.03%, 6.97%) (3.03%, 6.97%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 816 816 816 
    Average Daily Percent Change 6-12 months 76.2%*** 96.0%*** 100.0%*** 
Simple Slope 6-12 months 69.0%*** 86.5%*** 99.2%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (1.41%, 8.59%) (1.41%, 8.59%) (1.41%, 8.59%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 245 245 245 
    Average Daily Percent Change 12+ months 27.4%*** 58.1%*** 54.8%*** 
Simple Slope 12+ months 19.0%*** 45.6%*** 39.9%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (-.51%, 10.51%) (-.51%, 10.51%) (-.51%, 10.51%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 104 104 104 
* Significant at .1 Level 
** Significant at .05 Level 
***Significant at .01 Level 
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Figure 16: Detailed Breakdown of the Percent of All P Values That are Significant at the .05 
Level for a Two-Tailed Test For Directional Change of Slope After the Formation of A Double 
Bottom 
  Double Bottom 3 Day Double Bottom 15 Day Double Bottom 30 Day 
Average Daily Percent Change Overall 32.6%*** 60.1%*** 65.0%*** 
Simple Slope Overall 42.2%*** 47.5%*** 51.9%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (1.37%, 8.63%) (1.37%, 8.63%) (1.37%, 8.63%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 238 238 238 
 
   Average Daily Percent Change 6 months 65.8%*** 99.1%*** 98.3%*** 
Simple Slope 6 months 73.5%*** 85.5%*** 85.5%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (2.75%, 7.25%) (2.75%, 7.25%) (2.75%, 7.25%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 620 620 620 
 
   Average Daily Percent Change 6-12 months 22.2%*** 63.5%*** 82.5%*** 
Simple Slope 6-12 months 45.2%*** 50.8%*** 65.1%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (.94%, 9.06%) (.94%, 9.06%) (.94%, 9.06%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 191 191 191 
 
   Average Daily Percent Change 12+ months 22.2%*** 39.9%*** 40.3%*** 
Simple Slope 12+ months 25.8%*** 27.8%*** 29.4%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (-1.16%, 11.16%) (-1.16%, 11.16%) (-1.16%, 11.16%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 83 83 83 
* Significant at .1 Level 
** Significant at .05 Level 
***Significant at .01 Level 
 These results show that for every single group of window lengths tested, the percent of p values 
that are statistically significant falls well outside of the 99% confidence interval. This gives us significant 
confidence going forward that there is in fact something of interest going on around technical barriers. 
Future analysis will test whether or not the non-normal movement around these points is in fact in the 
expected direction. Beyond that, the fact that both the slope and the average daily percent change
17
 
both were significantly different before and after the formation of double tops and bottoms shows that 
                                                           
17
 This was simply calculated by taking the average percent change from one day to the next for N days of length 
where N is the length of the trend.  
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these results do not come from the way the slope was computed but can be extended to at least one 
other metric of trend following.  
Active traders as well as academics take interest not only in whether double tops and bottoms 
have statistical significance but also if these technical tops and bottoms act as true turning points in the 
market or merely moderate pre-existing up-trends and down-trends. The simplest metric to evaluate 
this is to examine what percent of the time a double top or bottom formed over a particular windowing 
length results in the slope of the trend reversing from positive to negative (top) or going from negative 
to positive (bottom). The following figures show how often a complete trend reversal occurred at 
double tops and bottoms. For our purposes, a trend reversal will simply be defined as switching from a 
negative 15 day past slope to a positive 3 (for the three day test) or 15 (for the 15 day test) day slope or 
vice versa. Similarly, switching from a negative past 30 day slope to a positive 30 day slope (or the 
reverse) will constitute a directional change for the 30 day test.  
Figure 17: Percent of Times that Forming Technical Pattern Resulted in a Complete Trend 
Reversal 
3 Day Top Reversal 22.29% 
3 Day Bottom Reversal 28.49% 
15 Day Top Reversal 18.88% 
15 Day Bottom Reversal 30.77% 
30 Day Top Reversal 18.57% 
30 Day Bottom Reversal 32.24% 
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Figure 18: Percent of Time Pattern Reversed a Pre-Existing 15 Day Trend 
 
 These results show that shorter time windows generally perform better than longer time 
windows do at spotting full reversals. The highest average for reversing patterns was a 30 day trend 
reversal for double bottoms. Unfortunately, even this metric does not clear the 50% mark. However, the 
previous results show that double tops and double bottoms do in fact alter the slope of a given trend. 
Thus we conclude that double tops and bottoms do not act as fundamental pivot points for general 
market direction but rather act as a point of temporary resistance for a longer term trends.  
 This may mean that these statements are more probabilistic than strictly directional. This is 
particularly unsurprising because these prices are generally considered to be stochastic processes. It 
appears that technical barriers identify a point at which it is likely that an asset will decline or increase 
temporarily but not change its fundamental trend. In this case, technical barriers provide a shifted asset 
probability distribution function after their formation.   
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 Beyond that, a total trend reversal around a technical barrier would be a shocking event. The 
failure to discover a common turning point for assets does not mean that technical barriers do not yield 
important information. Instead, it merely points to the need for a more sophisticated approach for 
measuring distributions of asset movements such as the Kolmogorov-Smirnov-style approach. As a final 
note, points that gave ‘mixed’ signals of both a double top and double bottom were included in the prior 
analysis. As these could easily comprise up to 15% of the sample for short window lengths, the true 
reversal rates for these patterns is probably significantly better in practice than this (and future figures 
of the sort) convey.  
 This crude estimator does produce an additional problematic element. At the shortest window, 
a double top appears to form at the same time as a double bottom up to 10% of the time. This primarily 
occurs during times when the SPX has traded within an extremely tight band with for a given time 
period. This, combined with the 1% margin of error can lead to a double bottom and a double top 
forming on the same day. This is clearly illogical and raises the question of whether this data should be 
included or excluded from the sample.  
One could argue that excluding these cases lends itself to data mining. While this argument is 
reasonable, allowing this data artificially excludes a stop that a trader would use on a technically driven 
by sell signal. Alternatively, it could be giving a ‘channel’ signal indicating that the series will remain 
range-bound. By definition, if there is not a clear direction in a market, the very kind of trading that is 
identified by technical barriers may not be possible to identify simply because it is not occurring at this 
point.  
 To see what the impact of excluding all dates that registered a double bottom and a double top, 
the above study was run for a second time. Since the simple slope is more mathematically valid for 
identifying a trend than average daily percent changes and their results were not significantly different, 
49 
 
the simple slope calculation will be used for the remainder of the study. The results obtained when 
omitting duplicate barrier points were significantly different and worthy of consideration. The first major 
area for consideration is the duration of window length and the percent of times that technical barriers 
formed. 
Figure 19: Percent of Time Double Tops and Double Bottoms Form in a Given Window Length 
(excluding overlapping intervals) 
 
 Here, the general pattern of declining incidences of windows declines in a fairly uniform way. 
The major difference lies in the fact that, especially for shorter windows, the duplicate specification 
error was fairly significant and resulted in a reduced total number of incidences of patterns. Importantly, 
the omissions of these points do not significantly change the significance of the formations. This 
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probably comes from the fact that the duplicate formations occurred most frequently for very short 
window length and those patterns constitute a relatively small part of the sample.  
Figure 20: Percent of All P Values That are Significant at the .05 Level for a Two-Tailed Test For 
Directional Change of Slope After the Formation of either a Double Top or a Double Bottom 
  
Overall Double 
Top Average 
Overall Double 
Bottom Average Overall Average 
Simple Slope with Omissions 47.6%*** 34.6%*** 41.1%*** 
Simple Slope Overall 50.0%*** 40.0%*** 45.0%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (1.45%, 8.55%) (.79%, 9.21%) (1.16%, 8.84%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 250 178 214 
    Simple Slope with Omissions 6 months 49.9%*** 68.9%*** 59.4%*** 
Simple Slope 6 months 44.7%*** 73.8%*** 59.3%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (2.82%, 7.18%) (2.4%, 7.6%) (2.64%, 7.36%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 663 467 565 
    Simple Slope with Omissions 6-12 months 78.8%*** 38.6%*** 58.7%*** 
Simple Slope 6-12 months 84.9%*** 45.0%*** 64.9%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (.92%, 9.08%) (.17%, 9.83%) (.59%, 9.41%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 189 135 162 
    Simple Slope with Omissions 12+ months 30.6%*** 16.4%*** 23.5%*** 
Simple Slope 12+ months 34.8%*** 27.7%*** 31.3%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (-1.05%, 11.09%) (-2.02%, 12.02%) (-1.48%, 11.48%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 85 64 75 
* Significant at .1 Level 
** Significant at .05 Level 
***Significant at .01 Level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
 
Figure 21: Detailed Breakdown of the Percent of All P Values That are Significant at the .05 
Level for a Two-Tailed Test For Directional Change of Slope After the Formation of A Double 
Top 
  
Double Top 3 
Day 
Double Top 15 Day 
Forecast 
Double Top 30 
Day 
Simple Slope with Omissions 33.8%*** 52.1%*** 56.8%*** 
Simple Slope Overall 36.5%*** 54.0%*** 59.7%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (1.45%, 8.55%) (1.45%, 8.55%) (1.45%, 8.55%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 250 250 250 
    Simple Slope with Omissions 6 months 41.9%*** 37.6%*** 70.1%*** 
Simple Slope 6 months 38.5%*** 36.8%*** 59.0%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (2.82%, 7.18%) (2.82%, 7.18%) (2.82%, 7.18%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 663 663 663 
    Simple Slope with Omissions 6-12 months 64.3%*** 84.1%*** 88.1%*** 
Simple Slope 6-12 months 69.0%*** 86.5%*** 99.2%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (.92%, 9.08%) (.92%, 9.08%) (.92%, 9.08%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 189 189 189 
    Simple Slope with Omissions 12+ months 14.5%*** 42.7%*** 34.7%*** 
Simple Slope 12+ months 19.0%*** 45.6%*** 39.9%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (-1.05%, 11.09%) (-1.05%, 11.09%) (-1.05%, 11.09%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 85 85 85 
* Significant at .1 Level 
** Significant at .05 Level 
***Significant at .01 Level 
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Figure 22: Detailed Breakdown of the Percent of All P Values That are Significant at the .05 
Level for a Two-Tailed Test For Directional Change of Slope After the Formation of A Double 
Bottom 
  
Double Bottom 3 
Day Double Bottom 15 Day 
Double Bottom 30 
Day Forecast 
Simple Slope with Omissions 17.7%*** 39.1%*** 47.0%*** 
Simple Slope Overall 20.6%*** 47.5%*** 51.9%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (.79%, 9.21%) (.79%, 9.21%) (.79%, 9.21%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 178 178 178 
    Simple Slope with Omissions 6 months 42.7%*** 80.3%*** 83.8%*** 
Simple Slope 6 months 50.4%*** 85.5%*** 85.5%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (2.4%, 7.6%) (2.4%, 7.6%) (2.4%, 7.6%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 467 467 467 
    Simple Slope with Omissions 6-12 months 18.3%*** 42.1%*** 55.6%*** 
Simple Slope 6-12 months 19.0%*** 50.8%*** 65.1%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (.17%, 9.83%) (.17%, 9.83%) (.17%, 9.83%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 135 135 135 
    Simple Slope with Omissions 12+ months 5.6% 18.1%*** 25.4%*** 
Simple Slope 12+ months 25.8%*** 27.8%*** 29.4%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (-2.02%, 12.02%) (-2.02%, 12.02%) (-2.02%, 12.02%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 64 64 64 
* Significant at .1 Level 
** Significant at .05 Level 
***Significant at .01 Level 
In a few cases, omitting the questionable double tops and bottoms actually made the estimates 
significantly worse while in other cases it improved marginally. Overall, there was not a great difference 
between the two estimates. Therefore, while it may be tempting to exclude ‘inconclusive’ double 
bottoms and tops from analysis, this is not necessary but does not harm results. The major rationale for 
excluding these specific patterns is that no logical trader would assert that an asset was simultaneously 
forming a double top and a double bottom. Even if one permitted this contradictory thought, 
predictions from this set up would be impossible because the top would indicate a shift up while a 
double bottom would indicate a shift down, which is contradictory.  
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Figure 23: Percent of Times that Forming Technical Pattern Resulted in a Complete Trend 
Reversal (Excluding Duplicates) 
3 Day Top Reversal 22.82% 
3 Day Bottom Reversal 28.39% 
15 Day Top Reversal 19.41% 
15 Day Bottom Reversal 29.99% 
30 Day Top Reversal 18.50% 
30 Day Bottom Reversal 30.99% 
 
Figure 24: Percent of Time Pattern Reversed a Pre-Existing 15 Day Trend (Excluding 
Duplicates) 
 
Here, we see almost identical rates of reversal from before. While there is a brief window (18 
days) for doubles at which double bottoms reverse trends over 50% of the time, technical barriers again 
do not appear to be a true reversal of pre-existing market trends.  
The difference in the finding on the double bottoms may stem from the fact that the overall 
trend from 1988 to 2008 was strongly upwards. Therefore, more tops than bottoms had to be broken 
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for this series of events to unfold. These results lead us strongly to believe that given a reasonable 
exclusion of simultaneously forming double tops and double bottoms, the appropriate window length 
for technical analysis is any time frame longer than 32 days (after which both double bottoms and 
double tops form less than 15% of the time) and shorter than 6 months in duration. This puts Lo’s work 
(Lo, 2000) towards the short end of the distribution but well within the acceptable range found in this 
study. As the previous results show, shorter time frames will lead to both a greater total number of 
barriers formed and, by necessity, a greater number of misreads. The selection of longer or shorter 
window lengths within this time frame does not seem to constitute a serious problem and may be 
chosen, as with many non-parametric parameters, at the discretion of the researcher within a 
reasonable bound.   
The Power of Breakthroughs 
 
 The previous definitions of double tops and bottoms only included assets that ‘brushed’ and 
therefore did not exceed their previous maxima by more than 1% on the day the technical barrier 
appeared to be forming. It is important to extend the definition of a double top to include a day where 
the asset ‘blew through’ the previous maximum or minimum by more than 1% exhibits statistical power. 
When an asset exceeds the old maximum by more than 1%, one might expect that this pattern could 
actually hold the reverse of a traditional double top, namely that the asset will accelerate past this point, 
not go down afterwards. The results of this change confirm this finding. First, as an average over all time 
windows, only 14% of the time after the formation of a ‘blown through’ double top or bottom did the 
asset reverse direction. This is markedly lower than the reversals of direction observed for the ‘close 
shave’ case. Beyond that, there is the question of statistical significance.  
 For every window length tested, if a double bottom was statistically significant, it resulted in the 
expected effect of the asset going up (or down at a slower rate) than it had been previously. The double 
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tops produced significantly different results. In their case, for the strong majority of window lengths, a 
‘blow through’ of a technical barrier actually resulted in an acceleration of the pre-existing up trend. This 
does not mean that every time the SPX clears a pre-existent technical top by 1%, it will necessarily 
continue its meteoric path upwards. Instead, what this means is that, on average, when the SPX blows 
through a double top by more than one percent, it is quite likely to continue to accelerate out of this 
pattern. The time period in which this sample was taken may bear responsibility for part of this effect.  
 The period from 1/1/1988 to 10/10/20008 represents an overall bullish period in stock market 
history in spite of the tech bubble and the beginnings of the current crisis. Therefore, it is natural to find 
that bottoms were much more stable than tops were during this time. That, fundamentally, is a pre-
requisite for a healthy uptrend. An attempt to categorize the sample into bear markets and bull markets 
immediately ran into sample size issues. Because this period was generally so bullish, only 26% of the 
sample period was spent below the 200 day moving average. Beyond that, this time did not necessarily 
even all come during true structural bear markets but was, to an extent, spattered throughout rough 
spots during otherwise significant bull markets. For these reasons, T-tests were not likely to produce 
significant results, especially for the windows of the longer durations.  
Closes vs. Minimums and Maximums 
 
 Up to this point this study has assumed that closes, and not inter-day prices, are the data points 
that should be used. This is not necessarily a warranted assumption for a variety of reasons. First, there 
are pattern day traders whose use previously defined maximums and minimums to attempt to profit 
from the inter-day movement of asset prices. Failing to use inter-day data ignores the contributions of 
this small but extremely active group.  
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Beyond that, it is a simple but serious omission of data to only track data registered at 4:30 
Central Standard Time (market close)
18
. Using inter-day highs and lows gives us access to a fuller range 
of data from throughout the trading day. Viewed in its most extreme sense, truncation of the data to 
merely its closing price omits so much information about its movement that it could be classified as 
random and systematic measurement error with respect to identifying the entirety of the series. The 
major downside to using intra-day highs and lows is that just because an asset ‘touched’ a point does 
not mean that its price stayed there for very long. Similarly, inter-day prices register large news 
announcements that cause temporary panics or run ups which then immediately fade. Therefore, using 
them may or may not improve the goodness of fit of a given model. 
 The success or failure of inter-day prices to give real technical information has implications for 
those who wish to use smoothing techniques (like kernel regressions) as well as practitioners using 
unsmoothed series. If highs and lows contain real information, simple smoothing off of just the close will 
omit key inter-day information and may systematically understate the impact of technical barriers. On 
the other hand, if adding highs and lows does not appear to add information, then researchers 
interested in using it for smoothing can more safely omit inter-day data. Because the use of inter-day 
prices will make days with extreme trading ranges look like both a double top and a double bottom, I 
will omit days that form both a double top and a double bottom from the subsequent analysis of double 
tops and bottoms.   
In an important divergence from previous tests, this section employs a one-sided T-test in the 
expected direction of the asset movement. A one-sided test is useful because it gives us directional 
information about where an asset is going to go. This differs from past tests which only tested if the 
                                                           
18
 Average True Range, a technical indicator based on the highs and lows of a measure of market volatility is also 
considered extremely important by some leading technical analysts (Faith, 2007). 
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technical barrier had some directionless effect on the asset movement. In the following figures, the 
results from using inter-day prices are compared with the alternative case of using closing prices (as 
previously described) and the practice of omitting cases where both a double top and bottom form. For 
these results, the N associated with the number of patterns formed when working with closing prices. 
The N reported is from the max/min method of top and bottom identification. While these N’s are 
significantly larger than their closing counterparts, there is no case where significance at the .01 level 
would be different if one used one set of N’s or the other. The results of this method are quite 
significant. 
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Figure 25: Percent of All P Values That are Significant at the .05 Level for a One-Tailed Test For 
Directional Change of Slope After the Formation of either a Max/Min Defined Double Top or a 
Double Bottom vs. a Close Defined Top or Bottom 
  
Overall Double 
Top Average 
Overall Double Bottom 
Average Overall Average 
Simple Slope Overall 
12.3%*** 31.6%*** 22.0%*** 
Simple Slope with Min/Max 50.0%*** 40.0%*** 45.0%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (1.79%, 8.21%) (1.37%, 8.63%) (1.6%, 8.4%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 306 239 272 
Difference in Percent of Significant P Values 2.4% 5.4% 3.9% 
    
Simple Slope 6 months 
43.9%*** 72.1%*** 58.0%*** 
Simple Slope with Min/Max 6 Months 44.7%*** 73.8%*** 59.3%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (3.03%, 6.97%) (2.73%, 7.27%) (2.9%, 7.1%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 813 611 712 
Difference in Percent of Significant P Values -4.2% 5.1% .1% 
    
Simple Slope 6-12 months 
0.0%*** 39.2%*** 19.6%*** 
Simple Slope with Min/Max 6-12 months 84.9%*** 45.0%*** 64.9%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (1.35%, 8.65%) (.98%, 9.02%) (1.18%, 8.82%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 236 195 216 
Difference in Percent of Significant P Values 6.1% 6.4% 5.2% 
    
Simple Slope 12+ months 
3.6% 8.7% 6.2% 
Simple Slope with Min/Max 12+ months 34.8%*** 21.5%*** 28.2%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (-.56%, 10.56%) (-1.09%, 11.09%) (-.79%, 10.79%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 102 85 94 
Difference in Percent of Significant P Values 4.2% 5.1% 4.7% 
* Significant at .1 Level 
** Significant at .05 Level 
***Significant at .01 Level 
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Figure 26: Detailed Breakdown of the Percent of All P Values That are Significant at the .05 
Level for a One-Tailed Test For Directional Change of Slope After the Formation of A Max/Min 
Defined Double Top 
  
Double Top 3 
Day 
Double Top 15 Day 
Forecast 
Double Top 30 
Day 
Simple Slope Overall 
10.0%*** 9.8%*** 17.1%*** 
Simple Slope with Min/Max 36.5%*** 54.0%*** 59.7%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (1.79%, 8.21%) (1.79%, 8.21%) (1.79%, 8.21%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 306 306 306 
Difference in Percent of Significant P Values 26.5% 44.2% 42.5% 
    
Simple Slope 6 months 
41.9%*** 35.0%*** 54.7%*** 
Simple Slope with Min/Max 6 Months 38.5%*** 36.8%*** 59.0%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (3.03%, 6.97%) (3.03%, 6.97%) (3.03%, 6.97%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 813 813 813 
Difference in Percent of Significant P Values -3.4% -1.8% -4.3% 
    
Simple Slope 6-12 months 
0.0%*** 0.0%*** 0.0%*** 
Simple Slope with Min/Max 6-12 months 69.0%*** 86.5%*** 99.2%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (1.35%, 8.65%) (1.35%, 8.65%) (1.35%, 8.65%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 236 236 236 
Difference in Percent of Significant P Values 69% 86.5% 99.2% 
    
Simple Slope 12+ months 
0.0% 2.8% 8.1% 
Simple Slope with Min/Max 12+ months 19.0%*** 45.6%*** 39.9%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (-.56%, 10.56%) (-.56%, 10.56%) (-.56%, 10.56%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 102 102 102 
Difference in Percent of Significant P Values 19% 42.8% 31.8% 
* Significant at .1 Level 
** Significant at .05 Level 
***Significant at .01 Level 
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Figure 27: Detailed Breakdown of the Percent of All P Values That are Significant at the .05 
Level for a One-Tailed Test For Directional Change of Slope After the Formation of A Min/Max 
Defined Double Bottom  
  
Double Bottom 3 
Day Double Bottom 15 Day 
Double Bottom 30 
Day Forecast 
Simple Slope Overall 
18.3%*** 38.1%*** 38.5%*** 
Simple Slope with Min/Max 20.6%*** 47.5%*** 51.9%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (1.37%, 8.63%) (1.37%, 8.63%) (1.37%, 8.63%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 239 239 239 
Difference in Percent of Significant P Values 2.3% 8.4% 13.4% 
    
Simple Slope 6 months 
46.2%*** 82.9%*** 87.2%*** 
Simple Slope with Min/Max 6 Months 50.4%*** 85.5%*** 85.5%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (2.73%, 7.27%) (2.73%, 7.27%) (2.73%, 7.27%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 611 611 611 
Difference in Percent of Significant P Values 4.2% 2.6% -1.7% 
    
Simple Slope 6-12 months 
19.0%*** 43.7%*** 54.8%*** 
Simple Slope with Min/Max 6-12 months 19.0%*** 50.8%*** 65.1%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (.98%, 9.02%) (.98%, 9.02%) (.98%, 9.02%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 195 195 195 
Difference in Percent of Significant P Values 0% 7.1% 10.3% 
    
Simple Slope 12+ months 
4.8%*** 14.1%*** 7.3%*** 
Simple Slope with Min/Max 12+ months 7.3% 27.8%*** 29.4%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (-1.09, 11.09%) (-1.09, 11.09%) (-1.09, 11.09%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 85 85 85 
Difference in Percent of Significant P Values 2.5% 13.7% 22.1% 
* Significant at .1 Level 
** Significant at .05 Level 
***Significant at .01 Level 
First, the percent of significant results obtained from this method are generally greater, to 
varying degrees, than previously used methods. The differences are smallest for window lengths of less 
than 6 months. However, for durations of greater than 6 months, the differences are quite significant. In 
this region, the max/min method produced significantly better results.  
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Interestingly, closes do provide a slightly better identification of double tops for durations of less 
than 6 months. For a one-sided test, many of the results for hitting previous closing prices (especially for 
double tops) is notably worse than their two-sided counterparts for durations of longer than 6 months. 
The most rational explanation for this is that when double tops of longer duration were hitting closing 
prices but not maximums, the days they were referencing for technical barriers had inter-day highs that 
were much higher than their closes. This divergence shows that for a long duration double top, hitting a 
previous high close is bullish indicator in that the asset accelerates into its previous high and then is 
likely to fall once hitting its previous inter-day high. In particular, this case shows the necessity of using 
previous inter-day highs and lows rather than just closing prices. Unfortunately, the introduction of 
maximums and minimums into the definition of a double top or bottom does not improve the ability of 
tops and bottoms to predict complete trend reversals. These results essentially mirror past results
19
. 
Figure 28: Percent of Times that Forming Technical Pattern Resulted in a Complete Trend 
Reversal 
3 Day Top Reversal 22.26% 
3 Day Bottom Reversal 18.66% 
15 Day Top Reversal 18.67% 
15 Day Bottom 
Reversal 29.11% 
30 Day Top Reversal 31.83% 
30 Day Bottom 
Reversal 33.31% 
 
In keeping with previous results, this pattern of declining incidences of the occurrences of 
various technical patterns decreases over the course of time. The following figures supply both the 
simple percent of times that a given pattern formed for a given window length as well as the logs of 
                                                           
19
 The relationship between window length and ability to determine trend reversals in this case was very similar to 
previous findings in this paper and do not merit lengthy discussion because reversals generally occurred slightly 
more often for small window lengths and less often for long window lengths.   
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these formations plotted against the window length. Both interpretations of the data point to a 
generally decreasing incidence of double tops and bottoms as the time frame increases. 
Figure 29: Percent of Times Patterns Form vs. Window Length 
 
Figure 30: Log of Percent of Times Patterns Form vs. Log of Window Length 
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The increasing superiority across time windows for the min/max method may be due to screen 
resolution for many traders. As time increases, it becomes increasingly difficult for the human eye to 
observe a chart with thousands of bars on a computer screen. For this reason, information is often 
truncated into weekly or monthly charts. Traders setting stops can more easily see this data and use it to 
set stops.  
 Validating this hypothesis is beyond the scope of this study. Future researchers with access to 
major traders may find this line of inquiry a rich and rewarding one. This information may open up a 
more general discussion of the problems associated with humans, rather than computers, identifying 
technical barriers.  
 Beyond the possibilities for future research in other areas, this has important implications for 
researchers wishing to understand the dynamics of technical barriers that are more than 6 months in 
duration. For these analysts, failing to incorporate minimums and maximums into their data will omit 
key pieces of information. Since there appears to be no significant downside in the short run for using 
maximums and minimums as key technical barriers, using minimums and maximums, rather than just 
closes may be something that should be integrated into standard practice within the field.  
Kernel Smoothing 
 
 Many academics have sought to smooth price series through methods more sophisticated than 
simple moving averages. One of these methods is kernel smoothing. This non-parametric technique acts 
as if each price point in the series is not just a single price point but a normal distribution of price P. The 
researcher then chooses (using a variety of techniques from empirical studies to sophisticated 
algorithms) a kernel length that determines how far the tails of this distribution will spread to the right 
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and left. Taking the average of these values produces a differentiable and continuous price series that 
can be easily used by template matching algorithms
20
.  
For our purposes, a windowing length of h=1 was selected to create a kernel-smoothed series. 
When this kernel length was applied to the closes of the series, it produced a series that was within the 
inter-day bounds of the series on 84% off all days. This suggests it tracks the series without over fitting 
it.  Falling within the inter-day bounds of the price series is well within the bounds of reason. Shortening 
or lengthening the duration significantly from this point either almost negates the point of smoothing or 
provides estimates that simply do not frequently fall within the inter-day bounds of the series. When 
this method was applied to the highs of the series, it produced a series that was within the bounds of 
the inter-day range only slightly over 50% of the time. This is an unacceptable level of divergence. In 
order to mitigate this, a new series was generated that was simply the average of the high and the close 
of the same day
21
. Similarly, an additional average of the low of the day and the close was generated.  
 After the generation of these series, these series were subjected to the same one-tailed T-tests 
that previous regressions had been. These tests whether or not the asset, not the smoothed series 
changes its distribution after the formation of a double top or double bottom. While it might be 
interesting to compute whether the smoothed series changed direction, the ability of any indicator to 
predict itself is much less pertinent than its ability to predict the underlying series and its movements. 
The results of the previously described one tailed T-tests are given below.  
 
                                                           
20
 For a full treatment of the methodology of Kernel smoothing, see Lo, 2000 pages 1709-1715. 
21
 Future researchers may develop more rigorous methods for determining the appropriate percent of the time 
that a kernel smoothed estimator should fall within or outside of the intra-day maximums of a price series. 
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Figure 31: Percent of All P Values That are Significant at the .05 Level for a One-Tailed Test For 
Directional Change of Slope After the Formation of A Kernel Smoothed Double Top or a 
Double Bottom 
  
Overall Double Top 
Average 
Overall Double Bottom 
Average Overall Average 
Inter-Day Max/Min Smoothed 15.3%*** 28.8%*** 22.1%*** 
Closes Smoothed 12.3%*** 34.4%*** 23.4%*** 
99% Confidence Interval (.96%, 9.04%) (.04%, 9.96%) (.58%, 9.42%) 
N 193 128 161 
    Inter-Day Max/Min Smoothed 6 
months 34.8%*** 60.4%*** 47.6%*** 
Closes Smoothed 6 months 33.3%*** 71.2%*** 52.3%*** 
99% Confidence Interval (2.55%, 7.45%) (2.05%, 7.95%) (2.33%, 7.67%) 
N 525 361 443 
    Inter-Day Max/Min Smoothed 6-
12 months 4.8% 39.9%*** 22.4%*** 
Closes Smoothed 6-12 months 1.6% 42.6%*** 22.1%*** 
99% Confidence Interval (.13%, 9.87%) (-.79%, 10.79%) (-.28%, 10.28%) 
N 133 94 113 
    Inter-Day Max/Min Smoothed 
12+ months 11.6%** 8.2% 9.9% 
Closes Smoothed 12+ months 7.8% 12.9%** 10.3%* 
99% Confidence Interval (-1.81%, 11.81%) (-4.49%, 14.49%) (-2.86%, 12.86%) 
N 68 35 51 
 
 
* Significant at .1 Level 
** Significant at .05 Level 
***Significant at .01 Level 
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Figure 32: Detailed Breakdown of the Percent of All P Values That are Significant at the .05 
Level for a One-Tailed Test For Directional Change of Slope After the Formation of A Kernel 
Smoothed Double Top 
  
Double Top 3 
Day 
Double Top 15 Day 
Forecast 
Double Top 30 
Day 
Overall Inter-Day Max/Min 
Smoothed 9.8%*** 13.0%*** 23.2%*** 
Overall Closes Smoothed 8.1%** 9.4%*** 19.3%*** 
99% Confidence Interval (.96%, 9.04%) (.96%, 9.04%) (.96%, 9.04%) 
N 193 193 193 
    Inter-Day Max/Min Smoothed 6 
months 28.2%*** 28.2%*** 47.9%*** 
Closes Smoothed 6 months 27.4%*** 25.6%*** 47.0%*** 
99% Confidence Interval (2.55%, 7.45%) (2.55%, 7.45%) (2.55%, 7.45%) 
N 525 525 525 
    Inter-Day Max/Min Smoothed 6-12 
months 4.8% 5.6% 4.0% 
Closes Smoothed 6-12 months 1.6% 3.2% 0.0% 
99% Confidence Interval (.13%, 9.87%) (.13%, 9.87%) (.13%, 9.87%) 
N 133 133 133 
    Inter-Day Max/Min Smoothed 12+ 
months 3.6% 9.7%* 21.4%*** 
Closes Smoothed 12+ months 2.4% 4.8% 16.1%*** 
99% Confidence Interval (-1.81%, 11.81%) (-1.81%, 11.81%) (-1.81%, 11.81%) 
N 68 68 68 
 
 
* Significant at .1 Level 
** Significant at .05 Level 
***Significant at .01 Level 
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Figure 33: Detailed Breakdown of the Percent of All P Values That are Significant at the .05 
Level for a One-Tailed Test For Directional Change of Slope After the Formation of A Kernel 
Smoothed Double Bottom 
  
Double Bottom 3 
Day 
Double Bottom 15 
Day 
Double Bottom 
30 Day Forecast 
Overall  Inter-Day Max/Min 
Smoothed 18.7%*** 32.6%*** 35.0%*** 
Overall  Closes Smoothed 23.6%*** 39.3%*** 40.3%*** 
99% Confidence Interval (.04%, 9.96%) (.04%, 9.96%) (.04%, 9.96%) 
N 128 128 128 
    Inter-Day Max/Min Smoothed 6 
months 47.0%*** 68.4%*** 65.8%*** 
Closes Smoothed 6 months 56.4%*** 79.5%*** 77.8%*** 
99% Confidence Interval (2.05%, 7.95%) (2.05%, 7.95%) (2.05%, 7.95%) 
N 361 361 361 
    Inter-Day Max/Min Smoothed 6-12 
months 19.0%*** 36.5%*** 64.3%*** 
Closes Smoothed 6-12 months 22.2%*** 42.9%*** 62.7%*** 
99% Confidence Interval (-.79%, 10.79%) (-.79%, 10.79%) (-.79%, 10.79%) 
N 94 94 94 
    Inter-Day Max/Min Smoothed 12+ 
months 5.2% 13.7%** 5.6% 
Closes Smoothed 12+ months 8.9% 18.5%*** 11.3%* 
99% Confidence Interval (-4.49%, 14.49%) (-4.49%, 14.49%) (-4.49%, 14.49%) 
N 35 35 35 
 
 
* Significant at .1 Level 
** Significant at .05 Level 
***Significant at .01 Level 
 Again, the majority of the tests for statistical significance of technical barriers hold at the .01 
level. There are a few interesting divergences in these results from previous results. First, there is the 
tendency of the 3 day moving average to not be statistically different from its 15 day counterpart. This is 
well within reason because this is a smoothed series. As a smoothed series, it is likely to miss the very 
first day or two of a pattern forming. These are precisely the days that the 3 day moving average would 
be most likely to diverge from its 15 day moving average. The inability of smoothed averages to predict 
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small but important changes like those immediately formed after a double top is an important weakness 
that should be considered by future researchers.  
In what is a result that is very difficult to interpret, none of the measures of statistical 
significance for double tops worked for the 6-12 month period. As noted previously, the sample as a 
whole was a bullish period in the market and therefore tops are naturally weaker. However, the reason 
that the 6-12 month period was insignificant but that parts of the 12+ month period as well as the 
entirety of the 0-6month period were significant is not easy to interpret. However, especially in the case 
of durations longer than 12 months, there were only 68 observations and that could have led to the 
insignificant result.  
As a general statement, averaging closes with highs (for tops) and lows (for bottoms) did not 
produce results which were significantly different from simply using closes. It appears that smoothing (at 
least in the manner done here) removes a great deal of the improvement in technical analysis brought 
about by the addition of maximums and minimums. 
As a side note, attempts were made to identify coinciding tops and bottoms of the VIX and the 
SPX. These results did not bear significant fruit primarily because the VIX is a naturally mean reverting 
process and consequently double tops and bottoms in that series did not tend to coincide with bottoms 
and tops in the SPX. The results of this investigation can be found in Appendix II.  
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Options and Equity Volume and the Formation of Technical Barriers 
 
The following analysis relies heavily on the Black-Scholes-Merton concept of delta-hedging. 
Delta hedgers attempt to exploit arbitrage opportunities by selling options when the implied volatility of 
options (D is above the actual volatility (E) those market will exhibit. This is a particularly profitable 
strategy because volatility tends to be a mean reverting process. Assuming that the Black-Scholes-
Merton assumptions hold, the profit realized by the delta-hedger is proportional to the difference 
between implied volatility and actual volatility. As shown in previous derivations, the elimination of risk 
from movements in the underlying is accomplished by buying and selling specific amounts of the 
underlying to offset potential losses due to movements from the underlying (Wilmott, 2006). In practice, 
delta hedgers are exposed to risk because they cannot hedge continuously. This exposes them to some 
risk associated with the movement of the underlying. However, this risk can be reduced to manageable 
levels by hedging very frequently. 
  This requires the speedy and costless ability to enter and exit options positions. However, many 
individuals and firms do not have the ability to quickly enter and exit stocks as is assumed by the Black-
Scholes-Merton purists. Individuals are often limited in their ability to sell stock due to well known 
restrictions on 401K purchases, while major firms cannot immediately exit the equity side of their 
positions without adversely moving the price against them. This is most notable in thinly traded equities 
where firms may own 1% or more of all outstanding shares in a given company. Attempting to sell them 
in a manner consistent with delta hedging would create massive price pressure to the downside in and 
of itself. In some cases, even if a firm wanted to exit its position entirely, it might not be able to do so for 
lack of counterparties (at a reasonable price).    
 Because these groups of investors are trapped in equity positions they cannot sell to exit, they 
may decide to make a rational decision to “overpay” (compared to a Black-Scholes-Merton delta hedger) 
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for a protective put in order to minimize the variation in the value of their portfolio as a whole. This 
insurance can come at a high premium, namely the price of the put. Therefore, since risk averse 
managers still have strong incentives to create profits, their desire to purchase this insurance will be 
both a function of their risk aversion and their market forecast. In the presence of strongly positive 
forecast, they would be much less inclined to purchase a put. However, in the case that they forecast a 
risk of a decline, they will be much more inclined to purchase a put to protect their assets. The 
maximum possible amount that a person could rationally pay for a put in the absence of a Black-Scholes-
Merton hedging argument is the amount that would violate put-call parity
22
. 
While this is an interesting theory, the delta hedging argument against price disturbances is 
quite strong. Therefore, it is necessary to rigorously consider a purely theoretical derivation to see if 
such a price divergence could be paid under a variation of the Black-Scholes-Merton argument. To do 
this, the Black-Scholes-Merton formula will be applied to an un-hedged portfolio. As previously noted, 
the Black-Scholes-Merton equation, reached through the argument of delta hedging, is:   
 
 + 12 	 
	
 +  	 	 −   = 0 (24) 
 The Black-Scholes-Merton argument must have significance due to the important arbitrage 
opportunities. The option prices arrived at through the Black-Scholes-Merton equation act as an input to 
the risk taking decision of the holder of the illiquid assets as they constitute the cost of insurance. 
However, the asset laden individual is, (by definition) un-hedged and therefore the change in the value 
of the un-hedged portfolio (V) conforms to the formula (Wilmott, 2006): 
                                                           
22
 When put-call parity is broken, can instantly and without risk short the overpriced put or call and buy a sufficient 
amount of the underpriced put or call to protect themselves against ant future declines. The level of miss-pricing 
must be large to execute this is in practice but it does provide an extreme case that cannot be violated, even 
outside of a Black-Scholes-Merton framework.  
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  =   + 12 	 
	
  +  	 	  (25) 
This model is, expectedly, exposed to the risk associated with holding an asset. Namely, that as 
the underlying fluctuates in price, the value of the portfolio fluctuates in value as well. However, these 
two equations can be combined into a single equation by first solving the Black-Scholes-Merton 
equation for %  (26) and then substituting that value into (25) to produce (27).    
 
 = − 12 	 
	 −  	 	 +   (26) 
 
  = − 12 	 
	 −  	 	 +   + 12 	 
	
  +  	 	  (27) 
Performing simple algebra, we are left with the result: 
  =  +  	 	 −  	 	  (28) 
The risk-averse manager
23
 seeking to reduce the variance of his portfolio (23) will buy a certain 
amount of puts F depending on his forecast of the market 24, and the total volume of shares he has to 
insure :. These puts will vary in value with the Black-Scholes-Merton model not because the participant 
can delta hedge but because other market participants can (to an extent) and therefore act as a price-
setting instrument. This is just a way of saying that an individual will introduce a certain number I puts 
into his portfolio but, critically, these puts will vary in value along with the Black-Scholes-Merton prices. 
This individual is then purchasing insurance for a percent of his portfolio I at some price presumably 
above the Black-Scholes-Merton price but then will have his portfolio vary with the standard Black-
                                                           
23
 Unfortunately, a consist risk aversion metric for major portfolio managers and/or retail investors does not exist. 
24
 In what can be a self fulfilling prophecy, the market’s collective forecast of the probability directly affects the 
true probability of a crash occurring.  
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Scholes-Merton arguments. Importantly, the percent of the portfolio I  that will be insured is 
determined exogenously. In the context of a firm, this can come in the form of risk-management rules. 
He will then add this purchase of insured puts to his portfolio to result in: 
  = F, : + 12 	 
	 +  	 	 −   +   +  	 	 −  	 	  (29) 
Here, the holder of the unhedged asset’s portfolio value is dependent on all of the traditional 
Black-Scholes-Merton constraints. This means that there is still risk in the portfolio but that the original 
formula for adjusting the price of the puts purchased still impacts the illiquid asset holder’s portfolio. 
Having established that, our investigation turns to identifying variables that, when appended to the 
classical framework, will correctly model this relationship. 
From 11/7/2007 to 11/7/2008 (which is the maximum range of the data available), the net 
impact of what was an already extremely low risk-free rate of return has had an essentially negligible 
impact on options prices and so will not constitute a significant portion of the analysis. However, the 
impacts of the change in price of the underlying and volatility is quite significant and therefore must be 
included in the model. Since this result is models the change in the value of the portfolio, it’s only 
reasonable that this model have the change in the value of a put (rather than its absolute value) as the 
dependent variable.  
Beyond the level of anticipated decline, the level of demand for puts (just like most other goods) 
will affect its price. Following the premise that asset illiquidity is linked to how recently an asset was 
purchased (primarily for tax reasons), the recent acquisition of assets will naturally increase the total 
number of shares that need to be insured. This will affect the demand for puts but will not affect those 
selling puts. Assuming both sides of the transaction have (on average across many transactions) a very 
similar view of what a delta hedged put at a given strike is worth, the equity-laden put-buyers will pay 
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additional premium for puts proportional to how many new equity positions they have acquired over 
the last N days. Therefore, some metric of position acquisition should be included to aid in the 
understanding of supply and demand dynamics.  
Identifying net asset acquisition is not as simple as looking for days on which the stock market 
moved up in value. A simple day on which the stock market closes higher than before does not 
necessarily indicate net equity acquisition (O’Neil 2002). It could be the case that the market moved up 
in price overnight due to movement in futures movement and then sold off for the entirety of the day 
when equities are much more heavily traded. Therefore, only those days on which the close of the day is 
above the average of the high and low of the day (or in other words is in the upper half of the intra-day 
range), is counted as a day of net equity acquisition. All days where this did not happen were counted as 
‘0’ because while the high volume selling of assets by other parties is interesting, it does not model the 
participant of interest: the investor with highly illiquid assets. This technique of volume aggregation is 
considered valid within that field and is often used (O’Neil 2002).   
While our work has shown that a variety of window lengths are acceptable, the length of 38 
days has been confirmed by surveys with active traders (Lo, 2000) and consequently will be used for 
these regressions.  In this formula CM is the cumulative acquisition measure of shares purchased, V is 
the volume on a given date, and Dp is the close to close price change on days the market closed in the 
top half of its intra-day range.  
 HI = J ∗ #-/38NO
DPA
 
 
(30) 
 Jointly, technical barriers and asset accumulation may offer significant insight into the nature of 
risk aversion and consequently the willingness to “overpay” for puts. This immediately presents 
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researchers with a problem best solved by a two stage least squares regression that models supply and 
demand dynamics (if the identification problem can be solved). As described previously, all participants 
will have the same information as to what they value of a put should be in a delta hedged environment. 
To this end, all of the significant elements of the Black-Scholes-Merton model (BSM), (delta, theta, 
gamma, and vega) will be included in the model. 
Beyond that, the speed of the previous uptrend
25
 (SL) should be included because while delta-
hedgers do experience low transaction costs, a quickly moving asset is, by definition, harder to hedge 
than a slower moving one
26
. The presence of a structural uptrend (UP)
27
 as well as the level of the VIX 
(VIX) were included to help measure structural fear in the markets. In the presence of an uptrend, equity 
holders will feel less compelled to hold put positions to protect their assets. The VIX is important 
because it acts as a consistent index of the implied volatility of puts. The VIX has also consistently acted 
as a gauge of market fear and anxiety. Both of these indicators are readily available to all participants 
and affect the willingness of parties to short or buy puts.  
While there are speculators who short puts in an effort to make profits on market increases 
through options, we will assume that those speculating on market declines (who do not hold equity 
positions) are of comparable size and strength and can therefore be ignored as a group. Having 
eliminated these players from the market, our model deals with two distinct participants: delta-hedgers 
and the owners of illiquid assets (typically major institutions or retail investors with tax constraints). The 
delta hedgers are the suppliers of puts while the holders of illiquid assets create the demand for these 
puts.  
                                                           
25
 This was determined using the previously defined method of computing a simple slope using differencing.  
26
 This is due to the problems of hedging jump processes and discrete hedging mentioned earlier in the paper.  
27
 This is defined as simply being above the 50 day moving average. 
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Having stated that, all market participants face liquidity risk stemming from the number of puts 
and calls (due to the ability to get a fill on an order) that are traded at a particular strike. If few option 
contracts are traded, it is harder to get insurance at that point or to adjust a delta-hedged position. 
Therefore both the volume of calls traded (CV) and volume of puts traded (PV) were included in the 
model. A dummy for a strike (ST) ending in ’00’ or ’50’ was also included because there is often an 
increase in volume when puts and calls are offered at the same strike across months which often occurs 
at strikes of those numbers (purely by the arbitrary choice of market makers). This effect is particularly 
significant because of the existence of multi-month, same strike calendar spreads. For reference, 
calendar spreads are a speculative options position that profits from assets staying in the same place. 
The following trading software diagram illustrates a slightly out of the money May/June calendar spread 
on the SPX. This spread was created by shorting the 875 SPX May put and buying the SPX 875 June put 
for a trade that is net theta positive and dependant on the index staying range-bound between 839 and 
915. This is a popular spread used widely by speculators who wish to express a view of market stability 
over a given time period.  
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Figure 34: Calendar Spread 
 
Since delta-hedgers can have significant losses in the presence of jumps, the 38 day moving 
average of Average True Range
28
 was included. Risk averse equity holders will, price notwithstanding, 
also be inclined to purchase puts during periods of high volatility to reduce the variance of the value of 
their portfolio. Finally, it is a well known result that out of the money puts are more expensive than 
would be expected by the constant volatility assumed by the Black-Scholes-Merton model (Wilmott 
2006). This phenomenon is referred to as the skew. While our model attempts to explain the skew 
endogenously, there may be components of it that our model does not capture. Therefore, any 
unexplained part of the skew is controlled for by a variable which gives a value to all puts equal to how 
far out (positive) or in the money (negative) a given option is. Following standard econometric practice, 
                                                           
28
 Average true range is the absolute value of the greatest distance the asset varied over during the last trading 
day. This necessarily means the true range for any given day is the largest of the following three metrics: the 
distance between the previous day’s close and the today’s high, the distance between the previous day’s close and 
today’s low, or the distance between today’s high and low.  
77 
 
a constant (C) as well as an error term (E) was included in both models. The risk free rate (r) is simply the 
annual Federal Funds Rate converted to a daily rate. Because options are traded by strike and expiration 
date, they must contain subscripts for the day they are traded (t) and their unique strike and expiration 
date combination (i). It should be noted that delta-hedgers are, by far, more inclined to sell options if 
they believe that implied volatility is greater than actual volatility. The resultant supply function for 
delta-hedgers is the following: 
 
	D% = QAQ	ID%@A + Q	RD% + QNS?D% + QTFD% + QBHD% + QU?D%
+ QV	WD% + QOXWY% + QZ[WID% + \D% + ]D% (31) 
Substituting the exact Black-Scholes-Merton arguments shown in (24), the result becomes: 
 	D% = QA  D%@A  + Q2 D%	% 
	 D%@A  + QN%	% 	 D%@A −  QT%D% + QB	RD%
+ QUS?D% + QVFD% + QOHD% + QZ?D% + QA^	WD% + QAAXWYD%
+ QA[WID% + \D% + ]D% 
(32) 
 The demand equation is identical except for the previously mentioned interest in double tops 
(DTOP)
29
 and cumulative purchases (see equation 30) over the last 38 days (CM). This yields the 
following demand equation: 
 
#D% = QAQ	ID%@A + Q	RD% + QNS?D% + QTFD% + QBHD% + QU?D% + QV	WD%
+ QOXWY% + QZ[WID% + QA^#W[?% + QAAHI% + \D% + _D% (33) 
 
 
                                                           
29
 This double top metric was arrived at using the intra-day high/low method and has duplicate values removed as 
was the best practice determined in the previous portion of the paper.  
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Substituting in (29) to get the necessary Black-Scholes-Merton arguments and combining terms 
(	% D% and %D% with common variables but different coefficients into a single term the full demand 
equation is: 
#D% = QA  D%@A  + Q2 D% 	% 
	 D%@A  +  QN%	% 	 D%@A + QT%D%
+  QB	% 	 D%@A  + QU	RD% + QVS?D% + QOFD% + QZHD% + QA^?D%
+ QAA	WD% + QAXWYD% + QAN[WID% + QAT#W[?% + QABHI% + HD% + _D% 
(34) 
In order to model this relationship, a two stage least squares random effects model
30
 was used. 
Generally, a panel structure for the data was advisable because options at different strikes and expiries 
offer protection of varying degrees depending on both their strike and time to expiry. A random effects 
model was necessary in order to capture both the constant dummy state of the uptrend (UP) as well as 
the moving average of accumulated stock purchases over the last 38 days (CM). So as to avoid 
measuring alleged “changes”
31
 in puts that are not transacted, only puts with a daily trading volume 
above 0 were considered.   
Because it is the change in prices on a day to day basis that concerns this study the most (due to 
the nature of the derivation), the changes in prices, rather than their absolute levels were modeled. The 
dependent variable in this regression is therefore the change in the cost of a put. Because the US 
government instituted a wide-spread ban on financial short selling on 9/19/2008, and short-selling is 
                                                           
30
 A fixed effects model produces almost identical results and does not in any way change the final conclusions of 
the paper. A random effects model was simply chosen because it fit the theoretical value of the data better. Due to 
the fact that the list of demand specific variables not related to either cross-section, it was not possible to perform 
a Hausman test. 
31
 In the absence of an actual transaction, models are often used to ‘fill in’ suggested prices for these options.  
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critical to delta hedging, only data before 9/19/2008 is included. The results of this two stage least 
squares random effects model 
32
are below. 
Figure 35: Two-Stage Least Squares Random Effects Model of Supply and Demand Dynamics 
in Options Prices 
Dependent Variable: Change in the Price of a Put 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
38 Day Double Top 0.224*** 3.749232 0.0002 
DS*Delta 
-0.772*** -339.379 0.0000 
38 Day Net Asset 
Accumulation Moving 
Average 4.36E-09*** 26.92178 0.0000 
C 
-0.71709*** -31.1825 0.0000 
 
* Significant at .1 Level 
** Significant at .05 Level 
***Significant at .01 Level 
 
Key Regression Statistics 
R-squared 0.916194     Mean dependent var -0.63327 
Adjusted R-squared 0.916182     S.D. dependent var 3.85028 
S.E. of regression 1.114706     Sum squared resid 26871.82 
F-statistic 5826.221     Durbin-Watson stat 1.850843 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000     Second-Stage SSR 177324.5 
Instrument rank 14     N = 10,815   
 
 
Non-Identifiable Variables Included in Two Stage Least Squares Random Effects Model: 
 
 
QA  D%@A  Q2 D% 	% 
	 D%@A  QN%	%
	 D%@A QT%D% QB	RD% QUS?D% 
QVFD% QOHD% QZ?D% QA^	WD% QAAXWYD% QA[WID% 
 
     
                                                           
32
 The random effects model chosen was the Wansbeek-Kapteyn random effects model. This model was chosen for 
computational reasons and produces results that are very similar to more common random effects models, 
especially for large samples which this certainly is.   
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The effect of double tops and asset accumulation are highly significant and in the expected 
direction. The positive coefficient on the double top indicates that puts do in fact increase in price 
around double tops. The positive coefficient on the recent accumulation of assets points to the fact that 
the preceding theory indicating the number of recently acquired shares increases the demand for puts is 
also correct. For this sample size, the Durbin Watson statistic of 1.85 is very slightly outside the 
acceptable interval but is not an extremely strong indicator of serial correlation. Since the test was not 
terribly far off its ideal value of approximately 2, it is reasonable to accept these results as being truly 
indicative of a significant relationship. The implications of this result are far reaching. 
First, it indicates that the level of demand for options can have a significant impact on their 
price. This has important implications for academics who are attempting to fully model options from a 
theoretical perspective as well as market practitioners seeking to forecast the cost of insuring their 
portfolios. The fact that supply and demand dynamics can have a significant impact on options prices 
also has implications for delta-hedgers seeking to understand the dynamics of options prices, 
particularly around technical barriers. 
Beyond that, this finding offers significant support to the practice of technical analysis. If market 
views about the chance of a significant decline around double tops is in fact so significant that they 
disrupt normal Black-Scholes-Merton equilibrium, they should be given additional weight by both 
academics and practitioners.  
Of course, there are problems with these findings. First, the sample window over which this 
finding was found was less than one year long. Second, this study exclusively focused on the SPX. The 
extent to which this same effect exists in other securities and indices is an important area for future 
research. Also, studying this phenomenon over longer time windows can only lead to stronger findings.  
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Conclusions  
 Intra-day maximums and minimums provide important information for the estimation of 
technical patterns for long window lengths but do not significantly outperform simple closes for window 
lengths of shorter than 6 months. Given that the current predominant emphasis is to focus on high 
frequency data, finding rigorous ways to incorporate high and low data into smoothed series remains an 
important and complex area for future research. Additionally, it appears that smoothing in the tradition 
of (Lo, 2000) is not necessary to identify double tops. Moreover, smoothing can result in a series that 
does not predict the very short run (3 day) changes in asset paths that occur immediately after the 
formation of double tops.   
In what is the most important finding in this study, the presence of double tops does in fact 
increase the cost of puts, even controlling for standard Black-Scholes-Merton arguments. This shows 
that while the Black-Scholes-Merton framework is quite robust, many market participants cannot delta 
hedge and therefore may be willing to pay more than the theoretical value of a put because they are risk 
averse. These findings point to an important and persistent departure from Black-Scholes-Merton 
equilibrium in options markets that to this point has not been adequately explained by existing research. 
The findings of this paper contribute to the introduction of classic supply and demand into options 
pricing theory. From a historical perspective, Bachelier’s work has been significantly improved upon by 
the Black-Scholes-Merton equation but his questions about the speculative nature of options still remain 
and are both economically and econometrically valid.    
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Appendix II: The VIX and the Identification of Double Tops 
 
 Previous work in this paper established that the best methodology for the identification of 
double tops and bottoms with a crude estimator involves the use of minimums and maximums and is 
viable over a variety of window lengths. Our attention now turns to the influence of volatility in the 
creation of double tops and bottoms. If traders do in fact rely on double tops and bottoms as risk 
management points for long and short positions respectively, then volatility may help predict successful 
double tops and bottoms. However, in order to determine if volatility is locally high or low, it would be 
helpful to be able to identify double tops and bottoms in the VIX in the same way that double tops and 
bottoms were identified for the SPX. Beyond that, some hold that the formation of a double top or a 
double bottom in the VIX can itself be an indicator that a significant market move is coming to an end. 
Therefore, it would be rational to think that if VIX double tops do hold predictive power that their 
overlap with SPX double bottoms might increase the predictive power of both measures.  
To test the hypothesis that there is a predictive relationship between volatility and the future 
direction of the SPX, I first employed the technical pattern identification method previously used on the 
SPX. Using minimums and maximums as the definition of where the asset and its technical barriers 
reside, I again employed a 1% threshold barrier to classify a double top or bottom for both the SPX and 
the VIX. Finally, I tested only those SPX double tops which coincided with bottoms in the VIX
33
. Following 
this general pattern, I only SPX bottoms that coincided with VIX tops
34
. Before beginning a summary of 
                                                           
33
 All data prior to 1/1/2008 was dropped from this analysis. The behavior of the VIX during 2008 has been 
extremely irregular. Whether the patterns observed in this study hold years into the future after the normalization 
of trading occurs after the present crisis remains to be seen and is an excellent subject for future study.  
34
 The reason that SPX bottoms were matched with VIX tops is that decreases in the SPX are typically associated 
with increases in the VIX while increase in the SPX are associated with declines in the VIX.  
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the findings on how the VIX impacted the reliability of SPX technical formations, I provide a summary of 
the predictive power of VIX double tops and bottoms on the path of the VIX.  
Figure 36: Percent of All P Values That are Significant at the .05 Level for a One-Tailed Test For 
Directional Change of Slope After the Formation of either a Max/Min Defined Double Top or a 
Double Bottom For the VIX 
  
Overall Double 
Top Average 
Overall Double 
Bottom Average Overall Average 
Simple Slope Overall 12.0%*** 29.4%*** 20.7%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (-.26%, 10.26%) (.13%, 9.87%) (-.04%, 10.04%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 114 133 124 
    Simple Slope 6 months 24.2%*** 46.7%*** 35.5%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (.55%, 9.45%) (.94%, 9.06%)  (.76%, 9.24%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 159 191 175 
    Simple Slope 6-12 months 6.9% 25.4%*** 16.1%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (-.13%, 10.13%) (.26%, 9.74%) (.08%, 9.92%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 120 140 130 
    Simple Slope 12+ months 8.9%* 23.3%*** 16.1%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (-.92%, 10.92%) (-.53%, 10.53%) (-.73%, 10.73%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 90 103 96 
* Significant at .1 Level 
** Significant at .05 Level 
***Significant at .01 Level 
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Figure 37: Detailed Breakdown of the Percent of All P Values That are Significant at the .05 
Level for a One-Tailed Test For Directional Change of Slope After the Formation of either a 
Max/Min Defined Double Top or a Double Bottom For the VIX 
  
Double Top 3 
Day 
Double Top 15 
Day Forecast 
Double Top 30 
Day 
Simple Slope Overall 5.9% 17.7%*** 12.4%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (-.26%, 10.26%) (-.26%, 10.26%) (-.26%, 10.26%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 114 114 114 
    Simple Slope 6 months 18.8%*** 32.5%*** 21.4%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (.55%, 9.45%) (.55%, 9.45%) (.55%, 9.45%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 159 159 159 
    Simple Slope 6-12 months 1.6% 7.9% 11.1%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (-.13%, 10.13%) (-.13%, 10.13%) (-.13%, 10.13%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 120 120 120 
    Simple Slope 12+ months 2.0% 15.7%*** 8.9%* 
 99% Confidence Interval (-.92%, 10.92%) (-.92%, 10.92%) (-.92%, 10.92%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 90 90 90 
* Significant at .1 Level 
** Significant at .05 Level 
***Significant at .01 Level 
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Figure 38: Detailed Breakdown of the Percent of All P Values That are Significant at the .05 
Level for a One-Tailed Test For Directional Change of Slope After the Formation of either a 
Max/Min Defined Double Top or a Double Bottom For the VIX 
  
Double Bottom 3 
Day 
Double Bottom 15 
Day 
Double Bottom 30 
Day Forecast 
Simple Slope Overall 24.0%*** 53.0%*** 11.2%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (.13%, 9.87%) (.13%, 9.87%) (.13%, 9.87%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 133 133 133 
    Simple Slope 6 months 44.4%*** 81.2%*** 14.5%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (.94%, 9.06%) (.94%, 9.06%) (.94%, 9.06%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 191 191 191 
    Simple Slope 6-12 months 23.8%*** 35.7%*** 16.7%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (.26%, 9.74%) (.26%, 9.74%) (.26%, 9.74%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 140 140 140 
    Simple Slope 12+ months 14.5%*** 48.4%*** 6.9% 
 99% Confidence Interval (-.53%, 10.53%) (-.53%, 10.53%) (-.53%, 10.53%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 103 103 103 
* Significant at .1 Level 
** Significant at .05 Level 
***Significant at .01 Level 
Despite the fact that the percent of p values that are significant are generally lower than their 
SPX counterparts, these results show that double tops and bottoms on the VIX are significant. The most 
significant non-finding was that, as a whole, VIX double tops are generally not significant when 
comparing the 3 slope after the formation to the prior 15 or 30 day slope for window lengths longer 
than 6 months. This may be due to the fact that spikes in the VIX can be highly driven by systematic 
market fear of particular events such as bankruptcy filings of major companies. These fears may persist 
for days but ultimately fall after a longer duration as the 15 day and 30 day double tops result show. The 
market activity that has occurred since October of 2008 may permanently change the behavior of the 
VIX and the strength of its mean-reverting properties. There is currently insufficient data to replicate the 
above study since what may prove to be a structural break. In the coming years, changes in the patterns 
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of the VIX will be a fruitful field for research and the replication of this study with new data may prove 
highly illustrative.  
There are a few important additional notes that should be mentioned regarding the nature of 
the VIX and these results. The VIX cannot be directly traded. Implied volatility can only be traded 
indirectly through options and delta hedging. The fact that volatility can be predicted by a crude pattern 
recognition pattern is in and of itself quite interesting but may be a mere reflection of its mean-reverting 
GARCH nature. As previously noted, technical patterns in equities are often due to automated sell and 
buy orders present at certain asset values for risk management purposes. While similar measures are 
not readily available for the VIX, it does lead us to the hypothesis that volatility might bought and sold as 
a commodity of sorts indirectly though options.  
If this is true, then supply and demand dynamics should be present in options prices. The 
identification of such a supply and demand dynamic would be aided greatly if it was found that double 
tops and bottoms in the VIX coincided with double bottoms and tops in the SPX. Given the mean 
reverting nature of the VIX, it is most likely that the double bottoms and tops identified here are a 
function of the fact that the VIX is a mean-reverting process. However, it is still of interest to see if these 
particular points where the VIX beings to revert back to the mean can give us improved insight into SPX 
double tops and bottoms. 
Therefore, having examined VIX double tops and double bottoms, our attention now turns to 
the question of whether coinciding VIX double tops and bottoms indicate technical barriers that are 
more or less likely to break. To do this, I will exclude all SPX double tops from consideration that do not 
coincide exactly with a VIX double top and then again attempt to perform the previously described one 
directional T-tests. These results show a significantly reduced percent of p-values that are significant. 
However, this may be due to the very low number of total data points at which there is an overlap.  
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Figure 39: Percent of All P Values That are Significant at the .05 Level for a One-Tailed Test For 
Directional Change of Slope After the Formation of either a Max/Min Defined Double Top or a 
Double Bottom 
  
Overall Double 
Top Average 
Overall Double 
Bottom Average Overall Average 
Simple Slope Overall 17.3% 13.0% 15.2% 
 99% Confidence Interval N too small N too small N too small 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 10 8 9 
    Simple Slope 6 months 31.6%*** 18.5%*** 25.1%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (-5.08%, 15.08%) (-6.01, 16.01%) (-2.93%, 12.93%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 31 26 29 
    Simple Slope 6-12 months 7.1% 1.6% 4.4% 
 99% Confidence Interval N too small N too small N too small 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 8 5 7 
    Simple Slope 12+ months 15.7% 16.3% 16.0% 
 99% Confidence Interval N too small N too small N too small 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 2 1 2 
* Significant at .1 Level 
** Significant at .05 Level 
***Significant at .01 Level 
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Figure 40: Detailed Breakdown of the Percent of All P Values That are Significant at the .05 
Level for a One-Tailed Test For Directional Change of Slope After the Formation of either a 
Max/Min Defined Double Top or a Double Bottom 
  Double Top 3 Day 
Double Top 15 
Day Forecast Double Top 30 Day 
Simple Slope Overall 12.4% 15.7% 23.8% 
 99% Confidence Interval N too small N too small N too small 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 10 10 10 
    Simple Slope 6 months 10.3% 30.8%*** 53.8%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (-5.08%, 15.08%) 
(-5.08%, 
15.08%) (-5.08%, 15.08%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 31 31 31 
    Simple Slope 6-12 months 14.3% 3.2% 4.0% 
 99% Confidence Interval N too small N too small N too small 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 7 7 7 
    Simple Slope 12+ months 12.5% 14.9% 19.8% 
 99% Confidence Interval N too small N too small N too small 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 2 2 2 
* Significant at .1 Level 
** Significant at .05 Level 
***Significant at .01 Level 
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Figure 41: Detailed Breakdown of the Percent of All P Values That are Significant at the .05 
Level for a One-Tailed Test For Directional Change of Slope After the Formation of either a 
Max/Min Defined Double Top or a Double Bottom 
  
Double Bottom 
3 Day 
Double Bottom 
15 Day 
Double Bottom 30 
Day Forecast 
Simple Slope Overall 10.8% 12.8% 15.5% 
 99% Confidence Interval N too small N too small N too small 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 8 8 8 
    Simple Slope 6 months 17.1%*** 15.4%** 23.1%*** 
 99% Confidence Interval (-6.01, 16.01%) (-6.01, 16.01%) (-6.01, 16.01%) 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 26 26 26 
    Simple Slope 6-12 months 2.4% 0.8% 1.6% 
 99% Confidence Interval N too small N too small N too small 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 5 5 5 
    Simple Slope 12+ months 12.1% 17.7% 19.0% 
 99% Confidence Interval N too small N too small N too small 
Average Number of Patterns Formed (N) 1 1 1 
* Significant at .1 Level 
** Significant at .05 Level 
***Significant at .01 Level 
  
Unfortunately, after the time period of 6 months, the number of times that the VIX and SPX 
have coinciding double tops and bottoms simply becomes too small to have true statistical meaning. In 
many cases for durations longer than 200 days, the number of total cases that can be examined is less 
than 10. The question of coinciding double bottoms and tops for the VIX and the SPX is one that needs 
to be studied by other means. This may include having different window length for the SPX than for the 
VIX (with the VIX window being shorter). Other indicators such as the VIX’s absolute level may also be 
more effective. Given the low overlap of barriers, especially for longer barriers, simple T-tests are no 
longer possible given a small sample size.  
 
